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INTRODUCTION

During 1970,1 the most conspicuous subject of criminal litigation
was the assault upon the constitutionality of a number of Tennessee
statutes, in both state and federal courts, with varying degrees of
success. 2 Among the more significant United States Supreme Court
decisions affecting state prosecutions were Williams v. Illinois,3 prechiding the incarceration of non-fine-paying indigents for a period exceeding that authorized for the offense; 4 Chambers v. Maroney, r, clarifying the standard for legitimate warrantless vehicle searches;", and Illinois
v. Allen, 7 constitutionally legitimizing appropriate responses to the disruptive defendant." Two areas that became increasingly fertile grounds
for judicial review in both state and federal courts were the deterrination of the validity of pleas of guilty,O and the expanding dimensions
of the protection against double jeopardy."'
11I.OFFENSES
A. Against Person
1. Aggravated Assault. in Reese v. State" the defendant was tried
for assault with intent to commit first degree murder 12 but was found
guilty of the common law offense of assault and battery, the jury
1. For purposes of convenience, covciage has been limited to those decisions that
appeared in advance sheets of the National Reporter System during 1970. As a
result, some 1969 decisions are the subject of discussion, and, conversely, a
n]umber of decisions rendered (hiring the past Near were not yet published.
In the latter case, some decisions had appeared in abbreviated form in the
CRIMINAL LAN%,RiPORTFR (hereinafter cited CRIv. I. RE'.), and these are fre(uently noted under appropriate headings.
2. See pp. 191-99 infra.
3. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
4. See pp. 202-03 infra.
5. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
6. See pp. 214-16 infra.
7. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
8. See p. 221 infra.
9. See pp. 233-35 infra.
10. See pp. 241-46 infra.
11. 457 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
12. TE NN. CODE ANN. § 39-604 (1955).
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apparently deeming this a lesser included offense. The evidence, however, merely showed that the defendant fired a pistol into the fender
of the automobile driven by the victim, catusing him no physical injury.
The court held that the absence of any showing of a battery rendered
the verdict unsupported by the evidence. 13 The court acknowledged
that a direct contact was not essential, distinguishing Huffman v. State, 14
where the defendant rammed her automobile into another causing
injury to those within. Nevertheless, by finding the defendant guilty
of assault and battery, the jury had of necessity found an assault,' 5 and
a simple assault was a lesser included offense of the crime charged.' 6
Since the evidence did support a conviction of assault, and the punishinent fixed was suitable for such a conviction, the court chose to treat
the reference to a battery as sturplusage and affirmed conviction for
simple assault.
A battery may also result front the constraint of the victim. Such
was the holding in Dlozlen v. State, 7 where the defendant was charged
with assault and battery with the intent to have unlawful carnal knowledge.1
The court found the battery proven by the statement of the
victim: "He had hold of the front of the skirt I had on.''" 19 Here, unlike
the Reese case, the jury had found the requisite specific intent to commit the felony. Although the defendant came no closet to accomplishing the crininal purpose than the description quoted above, the court
found that his statements, while not an explicit indication of an intent
to have carnal knowledge, did in the factual context evidence the
20
required nens rea.
2. Homnicide. An essential element of first degree nmurder at common
law, and by statute in Tennessee,'' is premeditation. The presence of

13. "A hattery is the intentional, unlawful touching or striking of the person of
another by the aggressor hinmself or hv any substance put in motion by him."
I WNHARTON'S CRIIINAL IAW AND PR()CEDURE § 337 (1957) (hereinafter cited
VHAR'rON).

14. 200 Tenn. 487, 292 S.W.2d 738 (1956).

15. "It is frequently said that a hatter% includes an assault o
assault."

I \VHARTON

16. Sotcwhat irrelevantly, the court noted that the
convicted under TENN. Coot ANN. § 39-613 (1955),
shooting into an occupied vehicle, a felony.
17. 450 S.\r.2d 788 (Tenn. Crinm. App. 1968).
18. TENN. Con

ANN.

is a completed

337.

§ 39-605

lefendanI could have been
for wantonly or maliciously

(1955).

19. 450 S.W.2d at 793.
20. -The l)efendant approached Mrs. Sherrod outside the Quick W\ash as she was
preparing to leave; he asked her if she 'sold it.' She replied that she was
married and had three children. The
you. '
Id. at 790.
21. TENN. CO)E ANN. § 3 -2-02 (1)65).

)cfcndant said, 'You

will or I'll show
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this element was questioned in Green v. State2 2 where the defendant
became engaged in a disagreentent with the deceased in a tea room in
the early morning hours. At one point he made a statement that might
have been understood as a threat,2 1 but subsequently the parties appeared
to have made peace. Later, however, the defendant returned to the
deceased's table and told him to go home. The latter replied that he
was grown and didn't have to, and repeated the statement at the request
of the defendant. The defendant thereupon drew a pistol and shot
the deceased three times, causing his death. The court held that the
lapse of time between the initial confrontation and the shooting was
adequate for the forming of premeditation, and the jury was justified
in concluding that such did in fact occur. The time interval had been
variously estimated by witnesses as from four to twenty minutes, the
least of which was more than enough. "The desire may be conceived
andt deliberately formed in an instant.'' -4 The decision is supported
by ample authority,2- although this language should not be read to
mean that the formation of the intent and the act may be simultaneous.2 " The dissenting opinion contended that while malice could be
prestnied froum the use of a deadly weapon, 27 premeditation could not
be prestmetl but nust be proven. Disputing the factual interpretation
of the majority, it was argued that nothing in the record indicated that
the intent to kill was formed prior to the act. Rather, it was suggested,
"If the defendant had acceded to the imperious request to go home,
nothing in the records appears to suggest that he would not be alive
today . ''
This, of course, ignores the possibility that the defendant
had made a conditional mental committmen t to kill, reserving the option
of chlnging his mind if the deceased got out of his sight. Certainly

22. 450 S.V.2d 27 (Tenn. Crin. App. 1969).
23. "NI brother killed a man the oiher night, and you're going to mess aiound
here and get killed, too." 1d. at 28.
24. Id.
25. Anthony v. State, 19 T enn. 265 (1838): Winton v. State, 151 Tenn. 177, 268
S.V. 633 (1924): Clarke v. State, 218 Tenn. 259, 402 S.V.2d 863 (1966), cert.
(leiel 385 t'.S. 942 (1966). See genciallv I NVr RiON § 267.
Sufficient evidience of premeditation was found in Smith v. Staie. 452 S.\V.2d
669 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).

26. '"['his would le absurd, for the volition, or mental act of forming the purpose
to kill nmTust,
of necessity, precede the physical act hy which the death is caused;
but vet, the latter act may succeed the former so quickly, that there may be
Scarcely an appreciable pause, oi intermission, between." Lewis v. State, 40 Tenn.
127,

147

(1859).

On the element
of ialice in homiide, see generally, Cook. Criminal Law ini Tennessee in 1969A Critical Siovey, 37 IiN 1L. Ri \'. 433. 436-40 (1970) (hereinafter cited 1969
Siuley).
28. 150 S.\V.2d at 34.
27. S'e Masses \. State. 456 SAV.2d 867 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
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premneditation could be found under such circumstances, and it would
not appear to be an irrational inference by the jury in the present
case.2- 1 Nevertheless, the dissent would require less equivocal showing
of premeditation. 3" The case is reminiscent of Simpson v. State3' where
the defendant confronted another in a cafe and inquired: "Do you
believe I'll blow your brains out?" and when the latter responded negatively, shot him. As the defendant was there convicted of second degree
32
Murder, the issue in the present case did not arise.
Willfulness, or an intent to kill, is an element of murder and voluntary manslaughter. Such an intent must also be shown where a defendant
is charged with assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter.
In WVilson v. State, a3 the court summarily rejected the contention that

an intent to kill could not be inferred from an assault with a soft drink
bottle and the blunt edge of a hatchet.
34
Involuntary manslaughter is defined as a non-intentional killing,
and in Allen v. Slat '7' the defendant convicted of this offense argued
on appeal that the evidence could only support a conviction for an
intentional homicide. Withont disptuting this allegation, the court
noted that involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included homicide offense, so that if the evidence would support a conviction for murder
or voluntary manslaughter, as it would, then a conviction for involuntary manslaUghter was appropriate. "
37
3. Sodomy. The constitutionality of the Tennessee sodomy statute
was challenged by a petition seeking an injunction against a criminal
prosecution in Polk v. Ellinglon.3" The substance of the plaintiff's argunient was not elucidated by the court, except to say that he contended
29. The dissent is correct in suggesting that the mere opportf unity for premeditation
(foes not prove that such did in fact occur. See, e.g., People v. Caruso, 246 N.Y.
437, 159 N.E. 390 (1927).
30. "If he had stood up and announced, 'I am going over and kill Snow,'; or if
he had taken his pistol out and walked over to Snow's table in a threatening
way, these facts would justify the jury in concluding a previously formulated
design to kill had taken shape.* 450 S.V.2d at 35.
31. 437 S.W.2d 538 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968).
32. The conviction was affirmed. Discussed in 1969 Survuey at 436-39.
33. 455 SW.2d 172 (Trenn. Crim. App. 1970).
34. See Vade v. State, 174 Tenn. 248. 124 S.W.2d 710 (1939); Roe v. State, 210 Tenn.
282, 358 S.V.2d 308 (1962); Bartlett v. State, 429 S.W.2d 131 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1968).
35. 454 S.W.2d 171 (Tenn. Crim App. 1970).
36. The court also called attention to a smattering of evidence which would support
a finding of a non-intentional killing, id. at 173, but this would not appear
crucial to the decision.
37. TFNN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1955). Crimes Against Nature-Penalty-Crimes against
nature, either with mankind or any beast, are punishable 1y imprisonment in
the penitentiary not less than five (5) years nor more than fifteen (15) years.
38. 309 F. Supp. 13,19 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
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the statute was overbroad and vague and was inapplicable to him.
Presumably, the plaintiff wished to challenge the phrase "crime against
nature" as failing to satisfy due process standards. Such a contention
39
has been successfully urged in a single case involving an Alaska statute.
The overwhelming weight of authority, however, has ftound the term
adequately defined at common law.4t A Seventh Circuit United States
Court of Appeals decision, 4 t relying on Griswold v. Connectictt,42 held
that sodomy committed by consenting marital spouses was not punish4
able, and a Texas federal district court has recently followed sUit. a
However, any such argument was unavailable to the plaintiff in the
present case since he was 63 years of age and was charged with having
committed the offense against his I1-year old granddaughter. As the
conduct of the plaintiff unequivocally came within the aegis of the
statute, the court was disinclined to consider the merits of the plaintiff's
argument under different circumstances. 44
Nor was the plaintiff in
this case in a position comparable to that in Kirkwood v. Ellington. 45
There the plaintiff successfully attacked a portion of the Tennessee
vagrancy statute, 4 t contending in a class action that the statute was
47
being employed discriminantly against Negroes.
B. Against Property
1. Larceny. Common law larceny is defined as "the felonious taking
and carrying away the personal goods of another." 48
It is clear that
the "another" spoken of need not have title to the propertv, 49 but he
must have an interest superior to that of the defendant. It has been
held that a material variance between the indictment and proof as to
39. Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alas. 1969).
40. 2 WHARTON § 751.
41. Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. deniied, 393

42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

1.S. 847

(1968).

43. Buchanan v. Batchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Texas 1970). See also Towlen v.
Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581 (W.D. Va. 1969): Jones v. State. 85 Nev. 411. 156 P.2d

429 (1969).
44. "[T]he doctrine of overhreadth, which allows a plaintiff charged with hard core
conduct that clearly could le punished under the statute to complain that the
statute sweeps too broadly so as to include constitutionally protected activity,
is a doctrine which indeed cannot he invoked in any case unless important
First Amendment rights are at stake."
309 F. Supp. at 1352.
45. 298 F. Stipp. 461 (W.D. Tenn. 1969).
46. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-4701 (1955).

47. See discussion in 1969 Survey at 448-49.
48. Fields v. State, 46 Tenn. 524, 526 (1869); State v. Brown, 68 Tenn. 53, 54 (1876);
Hall v. State. 75 Tenn. 685 1686 (1881); Williams v. State. 186 Tenn. 252, 255,
209 S.W.2d 29. 31 (1948). The common law offense is encompassed by TENN. CODE
ANN. 5 39-4202 (1955).
49. See Owen v. State, 25 Tenn. 330 (1845); Hall v. State, 38 Tenn. 454 (1858);
Renfro v. State, 65 Teinn. 517 (1873).
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the owner of the property is fatal to the prosecution. ,10 In Campbell v.
State -' the property stolen was alleged to be that of Flora Huckaby
Hobbs. However, the proof showed that one item, a record player,
had been stolen from another and placed in Mrs. Hobbs house, without
the latter knowing it was stolen. The defendant alleged a fatal variance
between the indictment and the proof. The court, however, found
ample support for the conclusion that Mrs. Hobbs' possessory interest
was sufficient to comply with the allegation in the indictment. 52 However, in Parton v. StatCr 3 the indictment for grand larceny alleged that
the property was owned by a corporation, while the evidence vested
54
ownership in an individual. The court found the variance fatal.
2. Receiving and Concealing Stolen Property. The distinction
between receiving and concealing stolen property 55 again became an
issue'"1 in State v. Veach. , 7 The defendant's conviction for receiving
and concealing stolen property had been reversed by the court of
criminal appeals for want of evidence that he had received the property
front a third person."
The supreme court held that the lower court
was correct insofar as the charge of receiving stolen property was concerned, but not as to the charge of concealing stolen property. While
it was true that the Jury had rendered a single verdict of guilt for "receiving and concealing stolen property," the court saw no reason to prevent
it from amending the judgment of the trial court by deleting the
"receiving" portion.
An essential element of the offense of receiving and concealing stolen
property is knowledge on the part of the defendant that the property
is stolen.5 "1 However, knowledge may be inferred from the unexplained
possession of recently stolen property. 0 The propriety of such an inference was considered in two recent cases. In Gossett v. State,65 following
50. Johnson v. State, 148 Tenn. 196, 253 S.W. 963 (1923)

(here the error was merely

as to the state under whose laws a corporation was chartered).
51. 450 S.W.2d
52. ee Hill v.
S.V.2d 728
53. 458 S.W.2d

795 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
State, 38 Tenn. 454 (1858): Watson v. State, 207 Tenn.
(1960). See also King v. State, 43 Tex. 351 (1875).
646 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).

581,

341

54. In Daugherty v. State, 221 Tenn. 56, 424 S.V.2d 414 (1968), the court indicated
that the name of the owner of the property was unnecessary to the indictment,
variance with the proof.
TEfNN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4217, 39-4218 (Supp. 1970).
See Cook, Criminal Law in Tennessee in 1968-A Critical Survey, 36 TENN. L. REV.
221, 227-29 (1969) (hereinafter cited 1968 Survey); 1969 Survey at 444-47.
456 S.W.2d 650 (Tenn. 1970).
See Deerfield v. State, 220 Tenn. 546, 420 S.W.2d 649 (1967).
See, eg., Bennett v. State, 435 S.W.2d 842 (Tenn. 1968): Kessler v. State, 220 Tenn.
82. 414 S.W.2d 115 (1967).
See Tackett v. State, 443 S.W.2d 450 (Tenn. 1969). Discussed in 1969 Survey at
hut if alleged it could not he at

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

444-47.
61. 455 S.\V.2d 585 (Tenn. 1970).
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the burglarizing of a manufacturing company, ten cartons containing
merchandise from the company were discovered a quarter mile away
in a wooded area. Officers marked the cartons and placed them under
surveillance. Later the same (lay the defendants loaded the cartons
in an automobile and were apprehended when they attempted to leave.
The defendants contended they had discovered the cartons earlier in the
day while hunting and assumed they had been abandoned. They denied
any knowledge that the property was stolen.
The supreme court
affirmed the conviction, finding no reason to disturb the inferences
drawn by the jury. 2 Similarly, in McGee v. State62 the defendant was
convicted of receiving a quantity of women's apparel stolen from an
Atlanta dress shop. He contended he purchased the dresses from two
unidentified men who sold them from the trunk of their car outside
an auction center. According to the defendant, the sellers claimed to
be in the business of buying out-of-season goods from stores. The court
found the jury was justified in rejecting the defendant's story and
inferring knowledge that the goods were stolen.
C. Against Person and Property
1. Robbery. Robbery has been described as an "aggravated larceny. ' " 4 Thus, to prove the crime it is essential that all the elements
of larceny be present, among them, an intent to steal. In Elliott v.
State"5 the defendant was convicted of armed robbery."
He contended
that the victim had stolen a pair of shoes from him ten clays earlier.
The defendant took a watch and ring from the victim at gunpoint in
purported satisfaction of the debt. The court found the proferred
defense unpersuasive. The likely inequity in the exchange would certainly raise scepticism as to the good faith in the claim of the defendant,
but the court went further: "[Elven if the property the defendant
alleged was stolen from him had been the very watch and ring later
taken from the person of the victim, the jury would still have been
67
justified in finding the crime of robber) was perpetrated.''"
The policy objective central to the reasoning of the court-to prevent
the recovery of debts by force or violence-is unassailable. The court,
62. Cf. Commonwealth v. Vozzelli, 217 Pa. Super 18, 268 A.2d 132 (1970).
63. 455 S.W.2d 656 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).

64. Crews v. State, 43 Tenn. 350, 353 (1866).
581, 584, 341 S.W.2d 728, 729 (1960).
65. 454 S.W.2d 187 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
66. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3901 (Stipp. 1970).

See also Watson v. State, 207 Tenn.

67. 454 S.W.2d at 188.
The court found one early decision, Black Ne. State, 11 Tenn.

588

(1832),

consistent with its conclusion. That case dealt with the abduction of a slave by
defendants who claimed ownership.
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however, overstates the case in observing: "The right of possession of or
title to the property taken is not the issue." 68 Indeed it is an essential
element of larceny, and therefore of robbery, that the property taken
be "of another.""
If the defendant can show either that he had an
immediate right of possession to the property, thereby rebutting this
element, or that he lacked the requisite intent to steal, the conviction
should not stand. While in the present case it may be concluded that
the facts establish neither defense, the rationale enunciated by the court
70
would appear contra to the majority view.

2. Burglary.

The common law crime of burglary, codified in Ten-

nessee, 71 includes as an element that the breaking and entering occur
at nighttime. While many jurisdictions have demanded precision in the
proof of this element,72 Tennessee decisions have been somewhat relaxed.
Thus, in 1962 in Trentharn v. State 7a the court found the admission of
the defendant that the crime occurred "that evening" was sufficient
74
proof that the entry was made at nighttime. Again, in Parton v. State,
proof that the crime occurred sometime between when "it was getting
(lark" and midnight was found sufficient to support a burglary conviction.
D. Public Offenses
Numerous Tennessee criminal statutes were the subject of constitutional attack in both state and federal courts. In Original Fayette
County Civic and Welfare League v. Ellington 75 the plaintiffs sought a
declaratory judgment that both the Tennessee disorderly conduct
statute7' and riot statute, 77 as well as the common law offense of criminal

68. 454 S.W.2d at 188.
69. See text accompanying notes 48-54, supra.
70. See 2 WHARTON § 565.
Of course, finding the defendant not chargable with
robbery would not preclude a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon.
71.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-601 (1955).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-901 (1955).

72. See Wiggins v. State, 4 Md. App. 95, 241 A.2d 424 (1968); People v. Taylor, 247
Cal. App. 2d 11, 55 Cal. Rptr. 521, 360 P.2d 33 (1966).
And see generally 2 WHARTON § 431; Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 643 (1962).
73. 210 Tenn. 381, 358 SAV.2d 470 (1962).
74. 455 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
75. 309 F. Snpp. 89 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
76. TENN. COnE ANN. § 39-1213 (Supp. 1969): Disorderly conduct declared a misdemeanor-Definition -Penalty. -It
shall be a misdemeanor for any person to
engage in disorderly conduct, which is defined as the use of rude, boisterous,
offensive, obscene or blasphemous language in any public place; or to make
or to countenance or assist in making any improper noise, disturbance, breach
of the peace, or diversion, or to conduct oneself in a disorderly manner, in any
place to the annoyance of other persons. Any person violating the provisions
of this section shall, upon conviction therefor, be fined not less than two dollars
($2.00) nor more than fifty dollars ($50.00); and in the discretion of the court
be confined in the county jail or workhouse for not more than thirty (30) days.
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trespass, were unconstitutional under the dlue process clause of the fourteenth amendment. As its criteria for evaluation the court turned to
two United States Supreme Court decisions, Connally v. General Construction Co.,78 which held that a statute could not be "so vague that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application,' T andi N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama,80 which held
that a legitimate governmental purpose could "not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of pro'
tected freedoms."'
Under such standards, the disorderly conduct statute was constitutionally intolerable because of both vagueness and overbreadth. The
prohibition of "rude, boisterous, offensive, obscene or blasphemous
language in any public place," as well as declaring criminal "to make
or to countenance or assist in making any improper noise, disturbance,
breach of the peace, or diversion, or to conduct oneself in a disorderly
manner, in any pltce to the annoyance of other persons," did not lprovide adequate notice of the conduct prohibited. Further, the firstquoted passage swept too broadly by limiting speech that might be
protected under the first amendment.8 2
The same, however, could not be said of the riot statute. With
respect to vagueness, the plaintiffs contended that the phrase "breach
of the peace" had no readily understandable meaning. The court,
construing the phrase in pari nateria with preceding language in the
statute, determined that an act could not be a breach of the peace unless
it was an act of violence, an interpretation which eluded the pitfall of
77. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-5101 (Supp. 1970): Definitions.-A. A "riot" is a public
disturbance involving an act or acts of violence by one or more persons who is
or are part of an assemblage of three (3) or more persons, which act or acts
shall constitute a breach of the peace, or an immediate danger or shall result
in damage or injury to persons or property.
B. "Incite to riot, to organize,
promote, encourage, participate in or carry on a riot" is the urging or instigating
or leading others to riot.
TENN. ConE ANN. § 39-5102 (Supp. 1970): Participating in, inciting, organizing riot-Penally.-Any person participating in a riot as herein defined or who
shall incite others to riot or who organizes, promotes, encourages, or participates
in a riot shall be guilty of a felony andI, upon conviction, such persons shall be
fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than one thousand
dollars ($1,000) or confined in the penitentiary for not less than one (I) year
nor more than five (5) years or both.
78. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
79. Id. at 391.
80. 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
81. Id. at 307.
82. And see Terrniniello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. I (1949).
Three weeks after the disorderly conduct statute was declared unsconstitutional, the Tennessee legislature enacted a new statute which read: -It shall
be unlawful for any person to disturb the peace of others hy violent, profane.
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vagueness.83 In suggesting the statute was over-broad, the plaintiffs
submitted that an individual could be a part of an assemblage of three
or more persons and be held criminally culpable for the violent act of
any other member of the assemblage. While conceding this to be a
plausible interpretation of the statute, the court concluded that "any
person participating in a riot," would include "only those persons who
actually are participating in the acts of violence without which there
would be no riot.'' s4 Nor did the riot statute infringe constitutionally
protected speech.,
Finally, the plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of the common
law offense of criminal trespass as defined in Temple v. State.8 ° There
the court said that unlawful entry, "accompanied with force amounting
to a breach of the peace, or such as is calculated ordinarily to produce
a breach of the peace" was a criminal trespass.8 7 Again, the plaintiffs
argued that the phrase "breach of the peace" was too vague to withstand
constitutional scrutiny. The court responded that the requirement of
force in gaining illegal entry rendered the offense sufficiently definite
and adequately restricted in application.

83.

84.
8'5.

86.
87.

indecent, offensive, or loisterous conduct or lan'guage; or by conduct calculated
to provide violence or a violation of the law."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1213
(Snpp. 1970).
The new act was short-lived.
In the yet-unreported decision,
Baxter v. Ellington 7 CRIM. L. REv. 2473 (U.S.D.C., E.D. Tenn., Aug. 13, 1970),
a three-judge court found the revised statute equally constitutionally vulnerable.
"The current statute still proscribes 'offensive or hoisterious conduct or language.'
This language is overbroad. The word 'indecent' may be subject to overbreadth
problems. This entire clause of the statute is void for overbreadth."
The Baxter case also considered the constitutional validity of two campus
disorder statutes. TFNN. CODE ANN. § 39-1215 (Supp. 1970) made criminal the
refusal to leave a school facility at the request of an administrative official
following acts interfering, or tending to interfere with normal, orderly, peaceful
or efficient conduct of a school facility. This statute was found to impose improper
prior restraints on First Amendment freedoms. "Little imagination is required
to conceive of acts interfering or tending to interfere with the normal, orderly,
peaceful or efficient conduct of an educational facility which fall within the
protection of the First Amendment. An obvious danger is that the administrator's hostility to the acts committed will influence his decisions. The entire
statute is vague and overbroad." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1216 (Supp. 1970), concetned with the blocking of ingress and egress to campus facilities, was found
constitutionally acceptable, with the caveat that when the issue arose, conceivably it would he necessary for the state courts to read into the statute a requirement that the acts be done willfully and knowingly.
The court conceded that the definition of "breach of the peace" found in an
early decision, State ex rel. Thompson v. Reichman, 135 Tenn. 685, 188 S.W.2d
597 (1916), could not withstand constitutional muster.
309 F. Supp. at 94.
"The Supreme Court has repeatedly drawn a distinction between mere advocacy,
which is an activity protected by the First Amendment, and incitement to
imminent lawless action, which is an activity that may be regulated and penalized
b, the State." Id. The court cited particularly, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969).
66 Tenn. 109 (1874).
Id. at I ll.
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attack was made upon a state statute prohibiting

prowling or traveling for the purpose of destroying property or intimidating citizens s8 in Armstrong v. Ellington.8 9 For purposes of constitutional analysis the court fotind it efficacious to divide the statute into
five types of prohibited conduct. First, the statute enjoined certain
activity which "disturbs the peace." Unlike the Fayette County case,
here there was no language in the statute which could be employed
to delimit the application of the term.'0
The court cited an earlier
state decision that had declined to recognize violence as an element of
"breach of the peace.'' "5
Thus confined to the common law interpretation of the offense, the court determined that such a definition could
. 2not withstand constitutional scrutiny under Terminello v. Chicago
because of overbroadness. 3 Equally indictable was the second variety
of proscribed conduct-behavior that "alarms the citizens." The third
division of the statute prohibited walking or riding with "the purpose
of damaging or destroying property.'

Vith the small clarification that

88. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2805 (1955): Any person or persons who shall willfully
prowl or travel or ride or walk through the country or towns, to the disturbance
of the peace or to the alarm of the citizens of any portion of the state, or for
the purpose of damaging or destroying property, or for the purpose of intimidating or terrorizing any citizen or citizens of this state, or for the purpose of
causing. through threats or intimidation or other improper means, any citizen
or citizens of this state to do or not to do any lawful thing or to do any unlawful
thing, shall be guily of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be fined
not less than fiftydollars (S50.00) nor more than one hundred dollars ($100.00),
and imprisoned in the county jail for not less than six (6) tnonths nor more
than twelve (12) months, said imprisonment to be within the discretion of the
judge trying the case.
"This statute was enacted at the titne of the Night Rider troubles and was
aimed at the activities of that organization.'
DeBoard v. State, 160 Tenn. 51,
53, 22 S.W.2d 235, 235 (1929).
The only other reported case involhing the application of the statute would
appear to be Essary v. State, 210 Tenn. 220, 357 S.W.2d 342 (1962) where striking
workers attempted to induce another through threat of force to quit his job.
89. 312 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D.Tenn. 1970).
90. Id. at 1124 n. 3.
91. -[T]hose acts which are breaches of the peace because the)' are disturbances in
public places. or because they, are annoyances to the public at large or persons
engaged in public futnxctions, are careftlly excluded from the rule requiring
violence, actual or threatened, as an element of the offense.
Those offenses
described as an annoyance to the public at large include those which are 'a gross
violation of decency and good order' . . . 'acts which tend to corrupt the morals
and debase the moral sense of the community' . . . and those which furnish
an 'evil example of a defiance of the law.'" State ex rel. Thompson v. Reichman, 135 Tenn. 685, 703.-04, 188 S.W. 597. 602 (1916).
See generallv 2 WHARtON § 803.
92. 387 U.S. 1 (1948).
93. Also relied upon were Cantw,ell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (19,16), and Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1964).
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"property" shoultd be understood to mean tangible property,"4 the court
found this provision to be sufficiently definite to withstand charges of
vagueness and overbreadth.
The final two portions of the statute
niade criminal traveling "for the purpose of intimidating or terrorizing
. . . citizens of this state," and traveling "for the pirpose of causing,
through threats or intimidation or other itproper means, any citizen
or citizens of this state to do or not to do any lawful thing or to do any
tnlawftl thing." While the coturt viewed the terms "terrorizing" and
"tithreat" as sufficiently definite, the same could not be said of the
alternative terins, 'intimidating" and "intimidation."1':'" With deference
to the state severability statute,911 the court sustained the constitutionality
7
of the statute, with the stated excisions."
A third case in which the phrase "breach of the peace" came under
.'
scrutiny was Jackson v. Ellington"
involving the constitutionality of
the statutor y prAohibition of inducing children to be absent from school
to participate in a public protest demonstration or breach of the peace. t'
The court found nothing in the statute which it deemed constitutionally
vague, with the possible exception of the teri "breach of the peace."
Aware of' the impossibility of giving the term its common law imeaning
94. "Otherwise, it might he asserted that the crime was cototoitced by anyone
walking in the exercise of the fundamental right to properly picket and properly seek a boycott, b)ecatuse he night ill SOneC lll2aSu'e dam age (fie Ibuisiness anlid
hence the intangihle property of the peison picketed.- 312 F. Supp. at 1124 nt.
95. -[A] literal reading of the statute could cause a persoti to Ie accused of and
arrested for violating the statute if he were walking merely for the purpose of
making a citizen timid or fearful or if he were walking merely to cause a citizen
to do a lawful thing by making the citizen timid or fearful. As used in this
.
statute -intimidation" and -intimidating ' stiffer froit vagueness as well as
overreadth."
Id. at 1126.
9i. TENN. CoDr ANN.
1-310 (1955).
97. The revised statute thus read: "Ans Ierson. or persons SWho shall willftIlly prowl
or travel or ride or walk through the country or towns * * * for the purpose
of damaging or destroying properly. or for the purpose of *
terrorizing
any' citizen or citizens of this state, or for the purpose of catusing, through threats
*
isanycitizen o- citizens of this state to do or not to io any lawful thing
or to do ant
ttlawful thing. shall Ibe guilhy of a itmisdeneaor, aid. tpot cmi
viction, shall be fined not less than fifty dollars (,5).00)
not more than one
hundred dollas (SI0).0)). and imprisoned ill the county jail foi not less than
six (6) months oi moe than twelve (12) months, said imprisonment to be
within the discretion of the judge irying the case." 312 F. Supp. at 1126.
98. 316 F. Supp. 1071 (W.I). Tenn. 1970).
99. TE-NN. Cone AN N'. § 39-1011 (Supp. 1970): itdicbg childrenito be absent from
school In participate ii demontst(ioit nor breach of peace.-ht is a unisdetneatior
for any person to urge. incite or assist any child of the age of eighteen (18) years
or tnder. who is registered as a stuident at alls pilllic or private school. to leave
the child's school while the school is in sessiol, for the purpose of participating
iii a pbillic protest denlonstraiollo
ieach of tile peace.
It is a uiisdetleallor
for aniy

personi

to aid. assist,

which would be a siolalio

inistruct

or urge ay

of (his section.

otlher

perli

to do

an)

act
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in Tennessee, 1"l the court proceeded to interpret the language in the
context of the statute. "Breach of the peace" was therefore read "to
stand for conduct in the nature of a 'public protest demonstration' " with
the additional element of disruptive activity. t 0 ' So construed, it may
be argued that "breach of the peace" has been rendered superfluous
as any breach of the peace, so defined, would also come within the
"public protest" clause. While such a result is inconsonant with the
canon of statutory construction that meaning should be given to every
word in a statute,' 0 2 this presumption may be overcome by a preference
to give a statute an interpretation which renders it constitutional.10 3
It now would appear that the only way in which "public protest demonstration" and "breach of the peace" can be made mutually exclusive is
by understanding the former term to relate primarily to demonstrations
that are lawful and peaceful, t" 4 and the latter to demonstrations that
are intended to result in a breach of the p)eace.'"1
The Tennessee obscenity statutes' 0 6 were constitutionally sustained
in ABC Books, Inc. v. Shriver.'' 7 Initially the court summarily rejected
the suggestion that the state lacked authority to regulate "what Tennessee
citizens may write, print, distribute, sell and read. t'0' 5
Next, the
plaintiffs contended that the absence of specific intent as an element
of the crime rendered it constitutionally objectionable. Here the court
found the reliance placed by the plaintiffs on Smith v. California0 9
was inaplposite as the ordinance there, unlike the language of the
Tennessee statute, required no knowledge on the part of the defendant.
100. The court noted that the same three judges had heard FaYette County, Armstroig, and the present case.
101. 316 F. Supp. at 1074.
102. See 2 SUTHFRIAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4705 (3d ed. 1943).
103. A court may view such a resolution of the problem more attractive than declaring a portion of the statute unconstitutional, even though they are accomplishing the functional equivalent.
104. Presumably this term would also include demonstrations which are unlawful for
want of a parade permit or other reasons not actually resulting in disruption.
105. Nor was the statute overly-broad as destructive of first amendment protections.
316 F. Supp. at 1075.
The court also upheld the constitutionality of TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-270
(1965), concerning contributing to the delinquency of a minor. See also Birdsell
v. State, 205 Tenn. 631, 330 S.\V.2d 1 (1959). This statute was repealed by Acts
1970, ch. 600, § 60, and replaced by TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-254 (Supp. 1970)
106. TlNN. CoDE ANN. §§ 39-3003, 3M04, 3005, 3007 (Supp. 1970).
107. 315 F. Supp. 695 (M.D. Tenn. 1970).
108. Id. at 697. This contention was rejected on the authority of Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
However, at least one court has viewed Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969), as overruling Roth in this respect. "Indeed, Stanley may reasonably be
read as supporting the proposition that obscenity is fully protected hy the First
Amendment." Stein %. Batchelo,, 300 F. Stipp. 612, 606 (N.D. Tex. 1969).
109. 361 U.S. 1,47 (1959).
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Objection was next made to the absence in the civil injunction portion
of the statute of provision for a prior adversary hearing.')
Here the
response of the court was that to the extent a prior adversary hearing
was constitutionally required, the Tennessee statutes did not preclude
such a proceeding."'
In so far as the statutes in question enjoined
the private possession of obscene materials they were unenforceable
under Stanley v. Georgia,112 but the court rejected the plaintiffs expansive argument that obscenity was constitutionally protected except
when it intruded on the privacy of non-consenting adults and children. 1 13
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the definition of obscenity promulgated in the statute was Unconstitutionally vague. While conceding
that the tests were "not crystal clear or easy of application,"' 14 the
court felt that the statute had codified the tests established by the
United States Supreme Court, and this was all that could be expected.
In Arutanoff v. Metropolitan Government,1 z Tennessee joined the
growing majority of statesi1 that have held that statutes requiring
t7
drivers and passengers of motorcycles to wear protective head gear"
are within the police power of the state and not unconstitutionally
vague. 118
Finally, a curious statute prohibiting the endeavors of fortune telling,
palmistry, phrenology, clairvoyance, spiritualism and similar pursuits,
only applicable in counties where the population exceeded 400,000 by
the most recent census,' 1t was the subject of constitutional appraisal in
2
CanIe v. StevCson"'.
The critical issue arising under the Tennessee
Constitution was whether this statute amounted to special legislation
because of its applicability in practice to a single county.121 While it is
not constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to make classifications in terms of a limitless number of characteristics, two essential con-

110. See Marcus v. Search Varrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); Quanitity of Books v. Kansas,
378 t'.S. 205 (1964). And see Abrams and Parisi, Inc. %. Ca,,ale, 309 F. Stpp.
13W0 (W.D. Terin. 1969).
11I. Nor was the authority to issue a tempolirry illjunictin without prior n1otieC
Consiitution ally intolerable.
112. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
113. But see Stein s. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex 1969); Karalexis v.
Byrne, 306 F. Stipp. 1363 (1). Mass. 1969).
114. 315 F. Snpp. at 702-03.

115. 448 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. 1969).
116. The court cited cases from elevcii states.
117. TEN,. CODE ANN. § 59-934

[d. at 411 n.4.

(Supp. 1970).

118. Cf. People v. Fries, 42 Ill.
2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969); American Motorcycle
Association v. Davids, I1 Mich. App. 351.
119. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1946 (Stpp. 1970).
120. 458 S.V.2d 797 (Tern. 1970).
121. TENN. CONST.%art. 11. § 8.

158 N.\V.2d 72

(1968).
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ditions must be met: First, the class nimst be open so that at least
theoretically new members may enter the class and old members may
drop out. Thus, for the purpose of constitutional legitimacy, a statute
made applicable only in Shelby CoUnty would be impermissible; a
statute applicable in all counties having a l)opculation of 400,000 accordin(' to the most recent census would satisfy this standard. In the present
case, the statute read "according to the federal census of 1950 and any
subsequent federal census."
Unfortunately, literally interpreted this
language would create a closed class, since the word "and" makes it
necessary that the county had the minimtim population as of the 1950
census. The court avoided this pitfall by interpreting "and" to mean
"or.-"' 12 Second. the classification adopted by the legislature must
have a reasonable legislative purpose; it intust not be arbitrary or capricious.
Under this standard, the present statute could not withstand
constitutional attack. While ii regard to some subjects it could reasonably be said that the problem was particularlV acute in densely populated
areas, no reason was present to persuade the court that fortune telling
and similar practices created a harim significantly different proportionate
to poptilation.1'. :
1
The 1970 session of the state legislature amended the lottery statute 24
by adding language to encompass certain types of chain letter schemes.1'
Potential pimnishment was increased for the offenses of disorderly con-

122. Sce 2 SiUTHERILAND, SiA'IU!O)R CONSiRUCIION § 4923 (3d ed. 1943).
123. "It is difficult, if not impossible, in perceive any icasonable ielationship between
poputation and whatever evils might accompany fortune-telling. But if any such
relationship does exist, it would seem more plausible that the areas ripe for
fertile pickings would consist of the rural counties of the state where the foittine
tellcrs coul prey upoii the sUppOsed gullihility of the residents, as opposed to
the large metropolitan cOunties where the populace allegedly is more sophisticated
ill the ways of the wiorld.
]ls sum,
there is no reason. not esen a poor one,
which can

justify this classificaiion." 458 S.V.2d

124. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2017

at

800-i.

(Supp. 1970).

125. The addition is as follows: "lie

organization

of anN

chain

letter cutb, pyramid

clut. or other group organized or hroughi logether umide any plan or device
whereby fees or dues or anything of material \alue tl be paid or gien ty iieisubers
thereof.
thichplaii or desvice includes aly pro isioii foi the increae ill stich
Seii I

tuliship throulghi a chaili

hers and
Ilemblters
members,
alls, such

prIocess of inew

i ielilters securing other new men-

theretu advancing themselves ini the group to a position where such
ill tuirn re(eise fees, dues or things of material value fromn other
is herety declared toie
a totters, and whoever shall participate in
totterv ty becoming a member of, oi affiliating with. any such group

or organization or who shall solicit any person for memhership or affiliation
ini any such gioup or oiganizatiou shall Ile giilty of a misdemeanor and upon
conviction thereof' shall he pilished Iby a fiie
of not less than one hundred
dollars (St00.11)
nor more than one thousand dollars
(SI.000.00). or Iy
imprisoiillei
il tIhe (olll
jail foi a period of nlt more than lhree (3) months,

or hoilh."
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duct, 1 " 1 loitering at night on public school or church grounds, ''7 disturbing religious, edLucational, literary, or temperance assemblies, 1 t 2X and
removal or injury of trees or other growth on public land.1' 2
Ill.

DEFENCES

A. Duress
Rarely does the defense of duress appear outside criminal law casebooks.' 3
Nevertheless, it did arise as an issue in a Tennessee and a
United States Supreme Court case during the past year.
In Hale v.
State'
the defendant was charged with participating in a burglary
offense, and she contended the only reason she accompanied her husband
to the vicinity of the crime, waiting in their automobile, was because
he had threatened to, in her words, "Beat the hell out of ne," if she
refused.
The trial court did not allow the defendant to introduce
evidence of violent and abusive treatment by her htsband in the past,
by which she hoped to demonstrate his propensity to such a command.
The appellate court reversed, holding that the evidence should have
been adllitted.t',
In

Un ited S/ales y. K',ojt 3

the defendant was charged with failing

to comply with federal gambling laws, btt the charges were subsequently
dropped because of the likely violation of the privilege against self

126. TENN. CODt ANN. § 39-1213 (Supp. 1970) (Twenty dollars to two hotud red
dollars substituted for two dollars to fifty dollars.
More severe punishlment
was provided lot second and subsequent, "convicttions. The definition of disorderly conduct was also revised.
See discussion note 82 supra).
127. Id. § 39-1211 (Tlwenty dollars to one hundred dollars substituted for two dollars
to fiftydollais. More severe puttishment was provided for second and subsequent
Coll
victiolts.)
128. Id. § 39-1204 (Fifty dollars to fise httttdred dollars suhstititted for twenty dollars
to two hundred dollars.)
129. Id. § 39-4522 (Fise to foul hundred dollars substituted for two to tweity-five
dollars.)
A yet unreported decision, l)ishman '. State, 8 CRIM. I. R t'. 2064 (Yletti.
Crim. App., Sept. 25, i970). hias hehl that a convictiolt of possessio of narcotics
caninlot
he sustained \%here the proof sthowed merely that the defendant haol been
foot d illal parltmelt occtiticd hv a iacotics peddler and marijotalla was ill
plain view nearl\.
130. In what would appear too lie the only previous Tennessee case on the subject,
leach v, State. 99 Teun. 58,. 12 S.W. 195 (1897). the court hell that duress
was not a valid defense to a charge of homicide.
131. 453 S.W.2d 424 (Tentn. Clit. App. 1969).
132. '"he trial judge could have allowed the defendant to have presented such
proof as she may have had to show upon what hases, if atly, her fear of the
person allegedly intimidating ltei
ested.
It may have resulted that the trier
of the facts would not have believed sich facts if he had listenel to it. but it
is inescapable that lie catitot believe it if not presented. If the defendant herein
is prevented from telling the court the ottly facts she has to suppoit her legal
position, then there is no way she cait establish it." Id. at 426.
133. 396 I'.S. 77 (1969).
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incrimination. He was, however, additionally charged with knowingly
34
and willfully making a frauduluent statement to a federal agency.
The district court dismissed all charges, and the government appealed.
The defendant argued, in addition to the privilege against self-incrimination, that as he was forced to elect between subjecting himself to
criminal penalties for refusing to comply with the statute and incriminating himself if he truthfully complied, the false statements were the
product of duress and therefore were not made willfully as required
by the statute. The Court found the protection against self-incrimination
inapplicable.' : It declined to pass judgment on the duress argument,
holding that the issue must first be determined at the trial.
IV.

PARTIES -0

THE CRIME

A. Aiding and Abetting
in Tennessee, a person found guilty of aiding and abetting an
offense is chargeable as a principal and subject to the punishment for
the substantive offense.'"
The question of sufficient proof of aiding
and betting arose in two cases. In Johnson v. State'3 7 the defendant
and another were charged with the theft of a dress from a department
store. The evidence against the defendant was that she held up a dress,
partially shielding from view the act of the other defendant in rolling
up another (tress and secreting it beneath her clothing. The two then
looked at each other and started to leave the store when they were
appnrehended by a secturity officer. The defendant argued that holding
up the dress was not a criminal act, and the prosecution had failed to
prove a case against her. The court properly concluded that such an
analysis was overly simplistic. It is not requisite for an aiding and
abetting conviction to show that the accused actually accomplished the
acts constituting the crime. Anything which facilitates the commission
of the crime by another, cotupled with a conimon intent, is sufficient.
The guilt of the principal in this case was fairly apparent. Following
the a)prehension she attempted to return the dress to the rack from
which it had been taken. There was also evidence that the two had
been in the same store together four weeks earlier. The court felt
"[t]he operation had a 1)rofessional cast to it,''"i1 ' and the infei ences
drawn by the july were not unreasonable. 1 a3
134. 18 tT.S.C. § 1001 (1948).
135. The self-incrimination aspect

of

the case is examined

in text

accompanying

notes 386-89 infra.
136.
137.
138.
139.

TENN. Coor ANN. § 39-109 (1955).
456 S.W.2d 864 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
Id. at 866.
The defendant also argued racial discrimination
accompanying notes ,463-66 infra.

in

the trial jury.

See text
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A frequently adjudicated aiding and abetting issue in Tennessee
concerns the culpability of an owner-occupant of a vehicle for offenses
40
committed by a person he has permitted to drive it. In State v. Morrisl
the owner permitted an intoxicated person to drive his automobile while
he, also intoxicated, was in the vehicle, either asleep or unconscious.
The court of criminal appeals had reversed the conviction of the owner
as an aider and abettor to the crime of involutary manslaughter. The
supreme court reinstated the conviction, finding that the owner knew
or should have known of the driver's intoxication and therefore was
properly charged. In light of the prior holding in Williams v. State,1 4 '
in which a defendant was found guilty of driving while intoxicated
where he was neither driving nor intoxicated, the Morris decision is
hardly surprising.

14

2

B. Accessories After the Fact
The identification of a party as an accessory may arise in situations
other than where the party is the subject of the prosecution. As a general
rule, a conviction cannot be based solely on the testimony of acconitplices to the crime.143 In Gann v. State' 44 the defendant was convicted
of third degree burglary and contended the case for the prosecution had
been based solely on the testimony of accomplices-two individuals who
had cashed checks stolen by the defendant. The court rejected the contention, reasoning that neither of the parties had known the defendant
at the time of the burglary, and therefore neither could be charged as a
principal or accessory to the offense. They were guilty instead of the
separate substantive offense of receiving stolen pro)erty' 4 and therefore
did not come within the rule requiring corroboration of the testintony
of accomplices. While the result in the case would appear sound, the
raiionale of the decision is less than satisfactory. The fact that the
witnesses were tnaware of the commission of the offense until sometime
after its commission is not of particular significance in determining if
they' are accessories after the fact. Unlike the statutes regarding accessories before the fact, 14 ; auld aiders and abettors, 14 7 the accessory after
140. 456 S.W.2d 840 (Tent. 1970).
141. 209 Tenn. 208, 352 S.X%.2d 230 (1961).
142. See also Eager %. State, 205 Tenn. 156, 325 S.W.2d 815 (1959).
143. See e.g., Willianms v. State, 216 Tenn. 89, 390 S.V.2d 234 (1965),
382 U.S. 961 (1965); Boulton %. State, 214 Tenn. 94, 377 S.\N.2d 936
v. Fowler, 213 Tenn. 460. 373 S.\%.2d 460 (1963).
144. 452 S.W.2d 685 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
145. TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 39-4217, 4218 (Stpp. 1970).
146. Id. § 39-108 (1955).
147. Id. § 39-109.

cert. denied
(19(i4): State
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the fact statute' 48 does not treat such offenders as principals. It is therefore quite conceivable that an individual could be an accessory after
the fact notwithstanding a lack of knowledge of the offense until after
its completion, as where A comes to B's residence and tells him he has
killed C, and B agrees to allow A to hide from the authorities on his
premises. Perhaps it is true in the )resent case that the witnesses are
not accessories after the fact since they come within the more particular
statute covering receiving stolen property, but such a determination
was not necessary for the resolution of the case, and the misleading
explanation of accessories could have been avoided. The court could
have as easily relied upon Monts v. State 4i) where the supreme court
categorically held that an accessory after the fact did not come within
the pmrview of the rule requir ing corroboration of the testimony of
Thus, once it was determined that the witnesses were
accomplices.
neither accessories before the fact nor aiders and abettors, no further
i1quiIry was reCquired.
V.

IPRO[CEDURE

A. Equal Protection
1. IVorking Off Fincs. The propriety of requiring indigent defendants to work off fines at a designated rate, long a matter of dispute in
the lower courts,' "1 came before the United States Supreme Court in
Williamis v. Illinois.51 More particularly, this issue before the Court
was whether an indigent could be confined beyond the maximum term
specified by statute for failure to satisfy the monetary portion of the
sentence. The defendant was convicted of petty theft and received
the maximnm sentence provided by law, one year imprisonment and a
$500 fine, and an additional $5 in court costs. Under state law, if the
defendant failed to pay the fine and costs, he would be imprisoned for
an additional period at the rate of S5 per day. The result in the present
case was incarceration for a period of 101 days beyond the maximum
sentence provided for the offense. The Suqpreme Court, citing Griffin
v. lillois, 152- conc1luded,
[\'V]hen the aggregate imprisonment exceeds the inaxinium period
fixed by the statute and results from an involuntary non-payment
of a fine or court costs we are confronted with an impermissible
discrimination that rests on ability to pay.'53
148. Id. § 39-112.
149. 214 Tenn. 171, 379 S.V.2d 34
150. See 1968 Survey at 233-35.

151. 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
152. 351 U.S. 12

(1956).

153. 399 U.S. at 240-41.

(196-1).
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The Court explicitly noted that the fact that in a given case an indigent might be imprisoned for a longer time than a non-indigent did not
per se result in a denial of equal protection, so long as the resulting
sentence did not exceed the maximum authorized for the crime. By use
of the term "involuntary non-payment," the Court did not preclude
incarceration, perhaps for a period in excess of the maximum sentence,
where a defendant was able to pay the fine but simply refused to do so.
2. Membership of Legislature. A unique equal protection issue
was raised in Phillips v. State' 5 4 where the defendant had been convicted
of rape and contended that the judgment was invalid because Negroes
had been systematically excluded from the legislature which enacted
the statutes tnder which he was convicted. While the court summarily
dismissed the argument, a consideration of the contention on its merits
would have been no less rewarding to the defendant. If it be assumed
that at the time the rape statute was first enacted' . - Negroes were
systematically excluded front the legislature, the fact remains that the
statute was re-enacted by each subsequent codification, the most recent
being in 1955, at which time systematic exclusion could not be successfully argued. 1 6; Furthermore, the broader implications of the argument
ap)car to have been foreclosed by the observation of Douglas, J., conctUrring in Baker v. Carr,'57 and presumably expressing the correct
view. 1 that "a legislature, though elected tinder an unfair apportionment scheme, is nonetheless a legislature empowered to act.''"51
The rule
has been followed in a number of Tennessee decisions. 1 0
3. Right to Transcript. While an appealing indigent defendant is
entitled to a trial transcript at no cost where the same is available to
62
'
one able to afford it," the Court acknowledged in IVade v. WilsonI

154. 458 S.W.2d 642 (Tenn. Critu. App. 1970).
1-5. The present TFNN. CODE ANN. § 39-3701 (1955) is derived from Acts 1829, ch. 23,

§ 13.
156. "Legislative seats are won and lost hy the elective process and there is no constiiUtional guarantee that a member of any particular ethnic or racial group will
he elected." 458 S.V.2d at 645.
157. 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
158. Cited was Cedar Rapids v. Cox, 252 Iowa 948. 108 N.AV.2d 253 (1961).
159. 369 U.S. at 250 n.5.
160. Horton v. Bomar, 335 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1964); Dawson v. Bomar, 322 F.2d 445,
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 993 (1964); In re Lollis. 291 F. Supp. 615 (E.D. Tenn. 1968);
State ex rel, Goss v. Heer, 220 Tenn. 36, 413 S.W.2d 688 (1967); State ex rel.
Fralix v. Bomar, 214 Tenn. 516, 381 S.V.2d 297 (1964): State ex rel. Smith v.
Bomatr, 212 Tenn. 149, 368 SV.2d 748 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 915 (1964):
State ex rel. Holbrook v. Bomar, 211 Tenn. 243. 364 S.W.2d 887 (1963): State
ex rel.Dawson v. Bomar, 209 Tenn. 567, 354 SAV.2d 763 (1962), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 962 (1962).
161. Griffin v. Illinois. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
162. 396 U.S. 282 (1970).
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that it had not determined "whether there are circumstances in which
the Constitution requires that a State furnish an indigent state prisoner
free of cost a trial transcript to aid him to prepare a petition for collateral
relief."' 63 A recent sixth circuit decision, Bentley v. United States" 4 held
that
In any case where a transcript is necessary for the taking of an
appeal (either direct or postconviction), an indigent appellant
has a constitutional right to have one furnished by the government, unless there are alternative appeal measures available or
this right is waived. 165
However, in .Jones v. State1 66 the request for a transcript of an original
trial and a previous habeas coripus proceeding was held properly denied
where the petitioner sought "the records only to explore the possibility
of filing another petition."' 67
B. Arrest
1. Temporary l)etention. The authority of law enforcement officers
to teniporarily detain individuals under suspicious circumstances falling
short of probable cause received constitutional sanction in 1968 in
Terry v. Ohio.t"" In Morales v. New York"" the Court refused to honor
an attempted extension of Terry to authorize taking a suspect to the
police station on less than probable cause.', T The Court renanded the
case for a further factual deterimination, suggesting the possibility that
the prosectution could show either that there was probable cause to
arrest, or that the suspects had voluntarily accompanied the officers
to the station.
Vhile probable cause is not a requisite of a temporary detention,
a ininirnal level of stIspition is reqUired171 and the power can not be
163. Id. at 286.

164. 431 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1970.)
165. Id. at 253.
166. 457 S.V.2d 869 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
167. Id. at 869.
See also Green v. State, 450 S.W.2d 27 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969). where the
defendant, an indigent, complained of the failure of the court reporter to provide him with a transcript of the arguments of cotnsel. While the issue was
avoided because of an absence of timely objection to the prosecutor's argument,
Oliver, J., concurring drew attention to a potential inconsistency between Supreme
Court Rule 2 and TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2035, 2037, 2040 (1970 Supp.)
And see Phipps v. State, 8 CR15!. L. REP. 2041 (Tenn. Crim. App., Sept. 14.
1970), where the court held that "[t]he ability to employ counsel does not necessarilv mean that a defendant is not indigent and entitled to a transcript at state
expense."
168. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

See 1968 Survey at 238, 243.

169. 396 U.S. 102 (1969).
170. See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). See 1969 Survev at 471-72.
171. See, e.g.. People v. Lingo, 3 Cal. App. 3d 661, 83 Cal. Rptr. 755 (1970); People v.
Albright, 32 A.D.2d 878, 302 N.Y.S.2d 213 (1969).
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employed as a license for warrantless searches. 172 In Riccardi v. Perini.73
officers observed the petitioner in the early morning driving slowly in
the vicinity of a bakery that had been twice burglarized in the previous
six months. The officers stopped the vehicle and directed the petitioner
to get out. They patted him down, discovering no weapons; a search
of the automobile was likewise unproductive. 7 4 The petitioner acted
nervous, admitted to being a parolee, and gave the officers an address
where he claimed to have been playing cards. The officers recognized
the address as non-existent and ordered him to empty his pockets, which
revealed rolls of coins and currency. The petitioner was thereupon
arrested and the evidence was seized. He was subsequently convicted
of burglary. The court held the detention could not be justified under
the rationale of Terry, as the officers lacked sufficient information to
stop the defendant, much less probable cause to arrest. A somewhat
similar case, Di Marco v. Greene,'"5 was distinguished as there the defendant was known to the officer as a parole violator, for which he was
subject to arrest, and following the arrest burglar's tools were observed
in the car.
2. Belief of Arrestee. Courts are not in agreement as to the extent
the subjective beliefs of arrestor and arestee are material in the determination of the occurrence of an arrest.' 76
Generally, the fact that
a suspect believes he is tunder arrest does not make it so. 1 7 7 In United
States v. Cortez'78 police learned of a rumor concerning the possible
dynamiting of an oil refinery. Believing the defendant might be helpful
in preventing the act of sabotage, a detective visited him and requested
that he come to the station. The defendant asked if he were under
arrest and was told he was not. He then agreed to accompany the
detective to the station. \Vhile there the defendant made certain statements which subsequently were used against him. He claimed he
believed himself in custody, and therefore the failure to give him his
172. Sihron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
173. 417 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1969).

174. It is likely this was an illegal search, absent any probahle cause to believe the
vehicle contained seizahle property. See discussion accompanying notes 256-65
inf ra.
175. 385 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1967). See 1968 Survey at 248.
176. The author has explored the cases in which this issue has arisen in Cook,
Subjective Attitudes of Arrestee and Arrestor as Affecting Occurrence of Arrest,

19 KAN. L. REv. 173 (1971).
177. "[Tjhe test must not he what the defendant himself . . . thought, hut what a
reasonable nuan, innocent of any, crime. would have thought had he been in the
defendant's shoes." United States v. McKethan, 247 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D.D.C.
1965).
178. 425 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1970).
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1 9
Miranda warnings rendered the inculpatory statements inadmissible.
The court rejected the argument, holding that the subjective belief of
the suspect could not be determinative of the nature of the confrontation.
3. Probable Cause. Frequently the critical issue in the deterinination of the legitimacy of an arrest is the presence of probable cause. s0
'While there is authority for the notion that the standard of probable
cause is higher when a warrant is not first obtained,t I' United States v.
Lec i s -' held that the inquir "is the same, whether made by a magistrate
on application for a warrant or made by a court after an arrest or search
and seizure without a warrant. ' " s
Where information on which probable cause is alleged comes from
a police informant' 4 noirmally the reliability of the informant must
be shown, 1 S5 by which is meant his reputation for providing authorities
with accurate information in the past. "5
However, information received
from an untested informant may. when contbined with additional
incriminating data, establish probable cause to arrest.' 7 Generally,
corroboration of the informant's report which consists of observation
of facts wholi innocent in themselves will not raise suspicion to the
level of probable cause. 1 -" However, the notorious Draper v. United
Slatesl1 1 lends credence to the possibility that confirming the accuracy

17!. See also text accompanying notes 405-06 infra.
180. See Cook, Probable Cause to Arrest. 24 VAPN. 1. REV. 317 (1971).
181. The source of cofusion is the dubious ptronoutcetent in united States v.
Ventresca, 380 1.S. 102, 106 (196,5): -[l]n a touhtful or marginal case a search
under a wartant may be sustainable where without one it would fail." See also
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 t.S. 108, 111 (1964); McCra\ v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300,
315 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
182. 428 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1970).
183. Id. at 921-22. The court cited Spinelli v. 'niteed States. 393 U.S. 410, 417 n.5
(1969): "While Draper [Draper v. United States. 358 U.S. 307 (1959)] involved
the qutestion whether the police had probable cause for an arrest without a
warrant, the analysis required for an answer to this question is basically similar
to that demanded of a magistrate when he considers whether a search warrant
should issue.181. The term is applied to individuals associated with the criminal envirotiment as
opposed to the random report of a victim of or witness to a crime. See generally
Donnelly, ludicial Control of Informant, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and 4gentt Provocatemrs, 60 YALE 1,.J. 1091 (1951).
185. Draper v. United States. 358 1.S. 307 (1959): Ker v. California. 374 U.S. 23
(1963): McCray v. Illinois, 386 tU.S. 30) (1967): Recznik v. City of I.oraine, 393
U.S. 166 (1968).
186. See e.g., United States v. Barnett. -107 F.2d 1114 (61h Cir. 1969). cert. denied,
395 U.S. 907 (1969).
187. See, e.g., Ballotr v. Massachusetts. 103 F.2d 982 (Ist Cit. 1968). rert. denied, 394
U1.S. 909 (1969): U nited States v. Comissiong. -129 F.2d 83-1 (2d Cir. 1970); United
States v. Ihb, 304 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 162), cel. denied, 371 U.S. 830 (1962).
188. See, e.g., U nited States v. Rundle. 282 F. Stipp. 926 (E.D. Pa. 1968): People
Verrechio. 23 N.Y.2d 489, 2,5 N.E.2d 222, 297 N..S.2d 573 (1969).
189. 358 IS. 307 (1959).
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of the informant's report as to non-incriminatory facts may justify belief
in the remainder of his report as well, at least where the general reliability of the informant is established.1'"0 Such would appear to be the
result in State v. Tolden.'"' The Lee case, taking its cue from Draper
and Beck v. Ohio,t2 held that information from an informant not shown
to be reliable, plus observations of innocuous facts, could not establish
probable cause to arrest. The court remanded the case, affording the
prosecution an opportunity to establish the reliability of the informant.
The validity of an arrest may be effectively challenged on grounds
that probable cause was gained through an invasion of the privacy of
the accused.1i 3 In United States v. Hooper't 4 an undercover agent
inveigled the defendants to unlawfully sell to him a quantity of taxunpaid liquor. For the purpose of consummating the sale, the agent
drove his autoutobile onto the residential property of one of the
defendants at their invitation. When the trunk of the vehicle was
opened for the purpose of loading the liquor, two additional agents
einerged and assisted the first in accomplishing the arrest. The court
sustained the arrest, noting that probable cause was established in the
presence of the participating agent, and while the presence of the two
hidden agents improperly intrudedtupon the premises, they acquired
no additional information which formed the basis of the arrest.') 5
C. Search and Seizure
I.ci(cl(ttt to Arrest. The severe limitations attached to warrantless
searches incident to arrest by Chimel v. California'"" continue to be
evidenced in decisions. In United States v. Hooper'17 the court held
8
that following a valid arrest for the unlawful sale of untaxed liquor,'"
the seizure of liquor in the intutediate vicinity of the arrest was proper
but a more general search of the area after the arrestee was taken from
the scene, "including a small outbuilding behind the bar, a 1960-model.
190. See Iso t'nited States v. Luster, 342 l.2d 763 (6th Ci. 1965), ,ert. denied, 382
IU.S. 819 (1965).
191. 451 S.W.2d 432 (Tenn. 1969).
192. 379 t'.S. 89 (1964).
193. The increased focuis on privacy in anlalyzing fourth amendment problems is
See also
primarily the result of Katz N. t'nited States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
v.lIes. 6 Cal. App. 3d 788. 86 Cal. Rptr. 274 (1970): Pate %. Municipal
People
Court, II Cal. App. 3d 72189 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1970): Brown v. State, 3 Md. App.
90. 238 A.2d 147 (1968): State v. Bryant, 177 N.\V.2d 800 (Miinn. 1970).
194. 306 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
1 95. See also Garza-Fuentes v. U nited States. 400 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1968), cet. denied,
394 U.S. 963 (1969).
196. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See 1969 Survey at 476.
197. 306 F. Stipp. 715 (E.D. Tenn. 1969).
198. See text accoipanving notes 194-95 suplra.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

automobile parked near the driveway, and a junked automobile at the
rear of the premises,''19 was constitutionally unreasonable.
In Vale v. Louisiana2 00 the United States Supreme Court avoided
deciding if Chimel should be accorded retroactive effect. The defendant
had been arrested in front of his house after which a search of the
premises was carried out. The Court found the search unreasonable
0
under pre-Chimel atuthority.1
1 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
20 2
held Chimel prospective in application in Turner v. United States.
A number of decisions have held that evidence may be seized incident
to an arrest but searched at a later time. '' The relevance of Chimel
to such procedures arose in United States v. Robbins. 2 4 At the time
of the arrest of the defendant at a motel, suitcases in the room were
given a cursory examination, revealing pistols in one of them. They
were then seized and taken to the police station with the suspects where
a more thorough search uncovered some counterfeit $20 bills stuffed
in a man's glove. These became the subject of the present prosecution.
Affirming the conviction, the court found the initial search at the motel
reasonable incident to the arrest and the second examination merely a
con-tinuation of the first.21';
Furthermore, the court submitted, as the
owners of the suitcases were being held in custody, it was proper for
officer to make an inventory of their possessions that were detained. 206
199. 306 F. Supp. at 718.
200. 399 U.S. 30 (1970).
201. Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969); James v. Louisiana 382 U.S. 36 (1965);
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20
(1925).
202. 426 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1970). See also United States v. Bennett, 415 F.2d 1113
(2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Schartner, 426 F.2d 470 (3d Cir, 1970); Repoter
v. Ashmore, 421 F.2d 1186 (4th Cir. 1970); Lyon v. United States, 415 F.2d 91
(5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Blassick. 422 F.2d 652 (7th Cit. 1970); Withaines
v. United States, 418 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1969).
203. See Evalt v. United States, 382 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1967); Malone v. Crouse, 380
F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 968 (1968); People v. Robertson,
240 Cal. App, 2d 99, 49 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1966).
204. 424 F.2d 57 (6th Cit. 1970).
205. The first search was said to have been discontinued in order to comply with a
local practice of allowing persons taken into custody to make telephone calls
within an hour of their arrest.
206. See also People v. Jackson, 3 Cal, App. 3d 921, 83 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970); People
v. Milligan, 245 N.E.2d 551 (11. 1969); Wright v. State, 236 So. 2d 408 (Miss.
1970); State v. Dempsey, 22 Ohio St. 2d 219, 259 N.E.2d 745 (1970): Yarbrough v.
State, 457 P.2d 826 (Okla.App. 1969); State v. Stevens. 26 Wis. 2d 451, 132 N.W.2d
502 (1965).
And see United States v. Blackburn, 389 F.2d 93, 95 (6th Cir. 1968): "The
police employed their usual procedure when a person who was staying in a hotel
or motel was arrested. In sending for the belongings of the parties there was no
intention of making a search for evidence or instruments of the crime. But the
conduct of the police department in sending for the personal effects of the
party, itemizing them and storing them for safe keeping was entirely reasonable
and logical."
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McCree, Circuit Judge, dissented, first challenging the validity of the
initial search at the motel. Noting the dual purpose of the search
incident to arrest to be to seize potential instruments of escape and to
prevent the destruction of evidence, he observed that the occupants of
the motel rooms were handcuffed prior to the initiation of the search,
thereby eliminating its justification. Such a finding would condemn
the second search as well, but should 'the first search be found reasonable,
the dissent submitted, the second still could not be sustained as incident
to the arrest because, quoting from Sloner v. California,207 "A search
can be incident to an arrest only if it is substantially contemporaneous
- °
with the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest.'' 2
As for the alternative theory of the majority, the dissent responded that
the prosecution had never suggested the second search was for any
purpose other than to discover evidence of crime.2 09
210
A surprisingly similar problem arose in United States v. Jones.
At the time the arrestee was placed in jail his belongings were taken
by the jailer. Some time later, the jailer examined the contents of
the billfold and discovered a counterfeit $20 bill. While the court was
somewhat ambiguous as to whether the original seizure of the wallet
was reasonable, 2' 1 in no event, in light of Chimel, was the jailer entitled
2 12
to "rutmmage through" the billfold at a later time.
2. 1'arrant Specifications. The fourth amendment specifically demands that warrants partictlarly describe "the place to be searched,
a nd the person or things to be seized."
When the issue is whether
the place to be searched has been described with requisite l)articularity
to withstand constitutional attack, the court will determine simply
whether the premises have been identified with such accuracy that the
executing officer can determine the place to be searched.2 3 Thus in
207. 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
208. ld. at 486.
209. "Moreover, it is questionable whether examining a glove for its contents can
he considered a legitimate aspect of an inventory procedure.
Such a close
scrutiny of the contents of the suitcase necessarily would seem to come within
the definition of a search." 424 F.2d at 60.
210. 317 F. Supp. 856 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
211. T he court quoted Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 116 S.W.2d 1009 (1938), to the
effect that the person arrested could be searched for the purpose of seizing articles
that might he used to effect an escape or what might he evidence of the crime
for which he was arrested.
In the present case the defendant had heen taken
into custody for failure to pay a fine and costs on a misdemeanor charge.
212. See also, the unreported decision, Martin v. State, 7 CRtM. L. REP. 2006 (Tenn.
Crim. App., Feb. 26, 1970), where Galbreath, J., dissenting, found the search of
the purse of the defendant sometime after her arrest unreasonable.
213. See Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
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United States v. Hassell214 the court found that the description, "the
Howard Hassell farm," was sufficient to satisfy consitutional requiremerits.
The requirement that the warrant designate the "things to be
seized" is designed to prevent "the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another." 2t 5 Courts have held, however, that where officers
are executing a valid search warrant, they are authorized to seize all
instrumentalities of crime and contraband they discover in the reasonable
execution of the warrant. 21 6 This would appear to be the answer to
the dissent in Snfith v. State -'I where objection was made to the seizure
of stolen property under a warrant for the seizure of narcotics, assunming that the executing officers were reasonable in believing the property
seized was stolen. The issue is not considered by the majority.
3. Open Fields. A commonly recognized exception to the requirement of search warrants is the seizure of evidence found in open fields. 2 1 s
Such a search was found reasonable in United States v. Curtis2 1 9 where
revenue agents detected the smell of hot mash front the highway 200
yards away, and the still was located in an open shed on property
unenclosed by fencing, not apputtenant to a dwelling. 2 5
In light of
Katz v. United States, 2- '2- recent decisions indicate a trend toward a protected privacy analysis in cases of this variety;2 22 the result in the present
case would likely be the same.
4. Abandoned Property. The protection against unreasonable search
and seizure is inapplicable to property that has been abandoned. The
possibility may arise when the suspect deliberately abandons the particular property seized, 22 : or where he abandons priemises on which

214. 427 F.2d 348 (6th Cir. 1970).
215. Matron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
"As to what is to he taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant."
Id.
216. See Adam %. United States, 192 U.S. 585 (1904): United States %. One 1965 Buick,
392 F.2d 672 (6th Cir. 1968); United States v. Alloway, 397 F.2d 105 (6th Cir.
1968). And see Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1005.
217. 451 S.W.2d 716 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
218. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (192-4).
219. 430 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1970).
220. The open fields exception has traditionally not applied where the area searched
was within the curtilage of a residence. Taylor %. united States, 286 U.S. 1
(1932); W'akktri v. United States. 67 F.2d 844 (6th Cir. 1933); Roberson v.
United States, 165 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1948).
Cf. United States x. Stroble, 431 F.2d 1273 (6th Cir. 1970) (discussed in text
accompanying notes 227-31, infra.)
221. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
222. See Wattenburg v. inited States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Ci. 1968); People v. Hobbs,
274 Cal. App. 2d 402, 79 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1969): People %. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d
1096, 458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
223. Hester v. tnited States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
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seizable evidence is found. 2 '4 A simple case of the first category was
found in Prock v. State"2 ' where the suspects abandoned a wrecked
2 '
automobile, leaving burglar's tools clearly visible in the open trunk.
A more interesting problem was presented in United States v.
Strobl c 2- -7 where seizure was made of a carton and a computer card
attached thereto that were found by the side of two garbage cans adjacent
to the curb bordering the property of' the defendIant.2 s Noting that
the evidence was discovered by an officer while on a public street, not
within the curtilage of a home, and apparently abandoned, tile coirt
the controlling standard:
fot
turned to Katz v. Unitcd States2"
'hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Anendment protection.
* * * But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
2 :
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. "
Accordingly, the court concluded the seizure in the present case was
23
not unreasonable. '
The second vat iety of prItporteLd abandonment atOse in United
States v. RobinIson:12 where, following the arrest of the defendant, officers
retutrned to his apartment and carried out a search. The facts of the
2 a
case were substantially ana logouIs to Uniited States v. Abel, ' wher e
an abandontent of the challenged evidence was found. In the present
case the court ignored the AbIci decision. and in finding the search
treatsonable implicitly exposed the fallacy of that holding. While it is
true that in both cases the property in question was "abandoned," it
2 3 4
Although the court
was not trte that it was vohtlmtarily abandoned..
224. Abel v. i'nited States. 362 1 .S.217 (1960).
22.5 .155
S\V.2d 658 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
226. At the time of the smizure the trunk had beein

closed 1))' SomIteone, but this
shortld not effect the charactcrization of the evidence as abandoned property.
Alternatively, as the insn runientalities of crime had ibeen observed in the vehicle
by officer previously, the seizure may be justified as a vehicle search with probable
256-65 infoi.
cause. See text a(ccompanying nies
I. REP. 2196 (Tenin. Crim, App. Oct. 21,
ItW see 1Denson %. State. 8 'rINI.
19)70().

227. ,431 F.2d 1273 (6th (:ir.

1970).

228. The carton had contained a
lefenldants were corlvicted.
229. 389 U.S. 347 (1%67).

stolen

television. for

the

possession

of

which

tile

2301.Id. at '3.51-52.

231. Cf. People v. Edwards. 71 Cal. 2d 1096. 458 P.2d 713, 80) Cal. Rplr. 633
State \. Chapman, 251) A.2d 203 (Me. 1970).
232. -130 F.2d 1141 (61 Cit. 1970).
233. 362 1 .S,217 (19(1))).

(1969):

231. Courts frequently refuse to horior the atandonirit theory whcre the purported
See. e.g., Moss v.
of the illegal act of the officer.
abandonment is the restlIt

Cox. 311 F. Supp. 1245 (D1I. 1970): Hobson v. tUnited States. 226 F.2d 890
'26 So. 2d 169 (Ala. App. 1969): State v. Masi.
(8th Ci. 1955): Ingrain v. Stal,
72 N.I. Super 55. 177 A.2d 773 (1962).
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did not hold that under the circumstances given abandonment was
iml)ossible, nevertheless, where "the party's absence from the premises
is involntary because of his arrest and incarceration, the government
should bear an especially heavy burden of showing that he intended
2
:
This the prosecution failed to do. 3'
to abandon them.''2
5. Consent. A warrantless search will be upheld as reasonable where
the prosecution can show genuine consent to search given by the party
in interest. 2 a7 However, where the suspect is doing nothing more than
acqtiiescing to what he takes to be the legitimate power of the officer
5 a9
2"
Thus in Huliffmn s. Stotc 2
to search, consent will not be found.
the purl)orted consent could not support the search where the officers
had exhibited an invalid warrant.' 4 1' On the other hand, in Thurman v.
State, - 4 1 detectives approached the defendant, advised him that the)
had information that he was hauling whiskey, and asked if he would
mind opening the trtnk of his car. At first the defendant balked, asserting that he did not have a key to the tirunk. One of the officers thereupon told him they could get a warrant. The defendant then agreed
to allow the officers to search and produced the key. Seventeen gallons
of unstamlped whiskey were found in the trunk. Implicitly holding
that it was immaterial whether the officers could have obtained a
242
warrant,
the court held the search reasonable by virtue of the consent
24 3
of the defendant.

235. 430 F.2d at 1143. "Whether premises have been abandoned so as to sanction
the warrantless scarch raises a significant issue of the intent of the occupier of
the premises, since his mere absence from the premises Without an intent to
abandon could not legitimize such a search."
Id.
236. But see United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884. 887 (101h Cir. 1970): "Defendant
argues that the expiration of the rental period should not control in this case
because his arrest prior to checkout time prevented him from returning to the
motel and perhaps extending the rental period. We are not persuaded hy this
argument for it was defendant's own conduct that prevented his return to
the motel."
237. See also 1968 Survev at 245-47: 1969 Surve, at 447.
238. Amos %. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1929); Johnson v. tUnited States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Salata v'. United States,
286 F. 125 (6th Cir. 1923) Catelanotte v. United States, 208 F.2d 264 (6th Cir.
1953): Fox v. State, 214 Tenn. 694. 383 S.V.2d 25 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
933 (1965).
239. 458 S.W.2d 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
240. The facts are analogous to those in Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543
(1968).
241. 455 SW.2d 177 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
242. "We do not believe that it is necessary to consider the question of the sufficiency
of the information received 1)y the officer to establish probable cause rCcquired in
our law to authorize the search of the car without a warrant." Id. at 179.
243. See also GatterdamNs. United States, 5 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1925): Simmons v.
Bomar. 230 F. Supp. 226 (M.D. Tenn. 1964): People v. Rupar, 244 Cal. App.
2d 292, 53 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1966).
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There is a presumption against the waiver of a foUrth amendment
right,2 44 and the burden of proof on the prosecution is greater where
the suspect is under arrest at the time consent is obtained.2 45However,
it is not necessary that the accused be advised of his fourth amendment
2 46
rights in a fashion analogous to the Miranda warnings.
When it is determined that effective consent has been given, the
search may not go beyond the bounds of that consent.2 47 This issue
arose in a unique way in Herron v. StatC2 4 where the defendant consented to a search of his home so long as he could accompany the officers.
After the search had progressed for a period of time, the defendant
observed one of the officers as he discovered some stolen property, and
he bolted from the scene of the search, making good his escape. The
search was continued, and additional items were seized. The defendant
contended that his consent was conditional on his presence, andi once
he departed the search could no longer be justified on the theory of
consent. The court rejected the argument and affirmed the conviction. - 4 1" The case would appear to be without precedent, although the
result is inconsistent with the general attitude of limiting effectiveness
of a waiver to its express terms.
6. Consent by Third Party. Peisons having equal access to premises
may, by consenting to a search thereof, effectively waive the rights of
244. Rosenthal v. Henderson, 389 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1968); Simmons v. Bornar, 349
F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1965); Kovach v. United States, 53 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1931).
245. United States v. Grey, 422 F.2d 1043 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Strouth,
311 F. Stpp. 1088 (E.D. Tenn. 1970).
246. United States v. Goosebey, 419 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970). But see Rosenthal v.
Henderson, 389 F.2d 514 (6th Cir. 1968), holding that the absence of warnings
is a factor to be considered in determining the validity of consent.
247. See, e.g., Honaig v. United States, 208 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1953); Oliver v. Bowens,
386 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1967); Pinizzotto v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d 582,
65 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1968); State v. Mitchell 285 Minn. 153, 172 N.W.2d 66 (1969);
State v. Johnson, 71 Wash. 2(d 239, 427 P.2d 705 (1967).
248. 456 S.W.2d 873 (Tenn. Crini. App. 1970).
2-19. "We hold that the condition in the consent that lie Ie present was waived b
the defendant when he voluntarily left.
His departure was not to effect a
cessation of the search. but was to effect his escape. When the defendant
escapes custody and beconies a fugitive froni justice when his appeal is pending
he is deemed to have waived his right to appeal hy his acts of escape ...
Ours is an analogous situation. It would appear that defendant conceived his
plan of escape when the officers were preparing to get a lawful search warrant
that would not have required his presence. got them to agree to take him to
his home without handcuffs, and when the search was thorough enough to begin
to bear fruit, he fled. The only apparent condition to the consent was his
presence, which the officers did all they could to achieve.
At no tiie was
defendant prevented from being present.
On the contrary, great effort was
exerted to find and return hiin. Clearly, the defendant waived his right to be
present: and the continued search was reasonable, unconditional and legal."
Id. at 878.
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co-o(cutpants.2''A conmon occurrence is consent to search given by
a spouse to the search of the marital residence. 2 5'
NAhere the consenting
party exercises a special dominion over the property of the party in
interest, a more JiirtiCuilariZed analysis of his authority may be required.
In Clarke v. Nel, 2 "2 police learned that the defendant had delivered a
suit worn on the day of a murder to the cleaners. They contacted the
manager of the establishment who allowed them to seize the suit. Laboratory tests made on the suit were introduced at the defendant's trial.
The defendant contended that the cleaner could not consent to the
search of the suit. TurYn ing again to Katz v. United States,2 52 1 the court
was "unable to find any significant invasion of anything which appellant
sought to 'preserve as private.'- 2,4 In depositing his suit with the
cleaner he knew that it would be examined by many people and made
no effort to preserve secrecy. McCree, Circuit Judge, dissenting, viewed
the court's analysis as incomplete.
Vhile the court was correct in considering the defendant's reasonable expectations of privacy, the fact
that he consented to the examination of his suit by individuals connected with the cleaning process did not mean he had authorized the
manager to tutu the suit over to the police.
"This activity went
beyond petitioner's 'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation
of privacy' with regard to the suit.''2'5
7. Vehicle Search. Searches of vehicles have traditionally been recognized as piresenting a unique fourth amendment problem.' 6 The
earliest United States Supremte Court decision to apply special treatment
to such cases is Carroll v. United States,"':7 where the Court held that
with probable cause to believe an automobile contained illegally
possessed liquor, a warrantless search could be made without violation

250. McGee v. State, 451 S.W.2d 709 (Tenin. Crim. App. 1969).
251. McCravey v. State, 455 S.W.2d 174 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970). There is Tennessee
authority to the effect that consent may tie ineffective where the parties are hostile
toward one another. See Kellex x. State, 184 Tenn. 143, 197 S.\V.2d 545 (1946);
Lester %. State, 216 Fenn. 615, 393 S.V.2d 288 (1965).
(Cf. criticism ini Moscolo,
lnter-SImusal Consent to Unreasonable Searches and Seiures: A Constitutional
A[qronoch, 40 CONN. l.j. 351, 375 n. 100 (1966).

252. 127 F.2d 1322 (6th Cir. 1970).
389 UJ.S. 347 (1967). See also text accomipanying notes 229-30 supa.
427 F.2d at 1325.
Id. at 1327.
Sec gencrally Hotis, St'asch of llo
Vehicles, 73 1)ncK. L. REV. 363 (1969):
Conmment, 17 1IC.I A. L. Ri-v. 626 (1970); Amoot., 19 A.1,.R.3d 727. And see 196S
Survey at 247-49; 1969 Sunw, at -178-80.
257. 267
1.. t32 (1925).
253.
254.
255.
256.
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o1 the fourth aniendnment.2 - Il The Carroll standard was recently reaffirmed in Chambers v. Maroney.2 5I1
Officers received a description
of an automobile and four men believed to be responsible for a service
station robbery and stopped a vehicle fitting the description sone two
miles from the scene of the robbery. The four were arrested and the
car was driven to the station. There it was searched and two revolvers,
a glove containing small change, and some cards bearing the narie of
an attendant at another recently robbed service station were Found.
The petitioner was indicted tr both robberies, and the various itemls
were introduced at his trial. The Court upiheld the search, concluding
that there was probable cause to believe the automobile contained
instrurientali ties and fruits of crime. \Wh\:ile noting that it could iot
be said tha t a warrant was never a pre-reqUisite to a valid vehicle scarch,
the Court noted in most instances the utility in searching a particular
vehicle will not be foreseen to the extent that a waiirant is practically
obtainable. Because ol the mobility of vehicles, time is usually of the
essence. Arguably, the prefeence to be given warrant sear ches could be
honored inl the present fattuial context b\y finldinig the waNrantless scizurc
of the vehicle reasonable, bitt postponing any search of the vehicle, now
safely in official cIstody, untiil a warrant Could be obtained. But to the
Court this seented a distinction without a difference. Once itis determined that adeu(iate justificaitioi ispresent to seize the car, it cannot
be said that Mn inmmediate search is a greater intrusion than holding the
'
On the author ity of Clamvehicle until a warrant can be obtained.26
bcrs, ColoSiIt u. PIr ni
was vatcated ald remanded for tlrther col2
sideration.' 6
The Chambers tVile is on lV o utility where there is probable cause
to believe the vehicle contains seizable i tents.2 ; : If the search be jistifLield
as i1cicett to) ar attest o1 ()e itt a vehicle, it utist ihe shown to be

258. '[T]he guaranty of freedomiil llo1 tlreas(olla le searciie ai i scizures has ilxa\s
b)eell conlstrtled, practically sil'c file IhCgilliing of1tile(Gmellunll, as reco(gnizinlg

ai necessary differece Ietwec

a iscarh of the store, dvwcling-h toise or olric
structure iil rCspctl o' which p oper
o
ffi(ialxvitrrallthas radil' Ic oiilailli(t.
andt search of it ship, niotorboat, wagon or atliotii/,
for contiabaid goods.
,vh/ec it is iot plactic llelC
I() seCuic
a \+ari'alltitiaise the vehicle (ai ie iluicktv
l

ed out of the

i0
ocllit\ or jrillstin

1 ill which the

musr
i.lllallit

be sorright."

Id. at 153.
2-)9.399 V.S. 42 (1970).
260. 1d. at .51-52. This,. of uomirsc. misses [ie istie. Cirucelcdl a warrantless search
is riogreater air] intrusionll
o
privacy than a it
warant search. Itie putp)se ill
requiring tie securing of file war riait is io allow a pir julicial dteterminationr
of whether a search may hl made it (ill.
26 1. 415 F.2d 80,4 (61h Cir. 19 9). .S' /969 Stuiureat 179.
26r2. Perini \,. Colosimo), 3)) t'.S.
519 (1970).
2W3. Cf. 'resi(on
v. 'nited States. 37i 1'.S.3/i-t (ti//t).
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spatially and temporally appurtenant to the arrest.2 6 4 Such an analysis
rendered a search unreasonable in Jenkins v. Hartman, 2 65 where the
trunk of the petitioner's car was searched some time after his arrest.
8. Admi.strative Searc'les. A unique fourth amendment problem
is presented in cases of administrative inspections authorized by statute.
Typical are inspections by municipal officers to detect and prevent fire
and health hazards. To maintain minimum standards of acceptability,
it is essential that the officer be empowered to examine all premises
within a designated area, notwithstanding the absence of probable cause
in the traditional sense or even suspicion as regards a particular premises.
7
2 6
and See v. City of Seattle26
In 1967 in Camara v. 11nicipal Court
the United States Supreme Court concluded that such inspections could
only be carried out I)Ur suant to a warrant except in those cases where
the party in interest gave his bona fide consent. The Court held, howeCeI, that it would not be necessary to allege the probability of an ordinance violation for a warrant to issue. Rather " 'probable cause' to
issue a warrant to inspect nlust exist if reasonable legislative or adininistrative standards for condttcting an area inspection are satisfied with
respect to a particular dwelling. '-2 ;s The Court made this added qualification in See:
\We do not in any way imply that business premises may not
reasonably be inspected in many more situations than private
homes, notr do we qtestion such accepted regulatory techniques
as licensing programs which require inspections
prior to operat2 6itg a business or marketing a product. '

Stich a regulator inspection problem reached the Court in Colonnadc
Ca terig
I U
CorI) . i. J07til( ,States,- 7 " where the petitioner was a professional
catering service. Federal agents, suspecting a violation of the excise
tax law, retjuested that a locked liquor storeroom be opened lot their
inspection. The president of the petitioner corporation refused to open
the storeroom in the absence of a search warrant, whercu])on the agents
broke the lock, entered, and seized the bottles of liquor which were
introduced into evidence at the trial. The court reversed the conviction
finding the search unreasonable.
264. See United States \. Cain, 332

.2d 999 (6th Cit.

1964); Fox v. State, 214 Tenn.

694, 383 S.W.2d 25 (196-t), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 933 (1965).
265. 314 F. Supp. 303 (E.). Tei. 1970).
266. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
267. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
268. Camara V. Munuicipal Court, 387 1;.S. at 538.
269. See v. (;ity of Seattle, 387 11,S. at 5t5.
270. 392 t.S. 72 (1970).
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The Colonnade decision clearly held that fourth amendment reasonableness may within certain limits be controlled by legislative action.
Warrantless inspections of premises of retail liquor dealers were authorized by statute, ' 7t but the statute said nothing about forcible entry in
the face of obstruction. 2" 2 On the other hand, another statute provided
a penalty in the event of failure to cooperate.2 7
The Court quoted
dictuin in Frank v. Maryland2 7 4 indicating that the imposition of a fine
for resistance implicitly precluded the authority of the inspector to
forcibly enter. 27 5 Concluded the Court,
Where Congress has authorized inspection but made no rules
governing the procedure that inspectors must follow, the Fourth
7
Amendment and its various restrictive rules apply.2 6
Thus we return to the warrant requirement of Camara and See. The
Court left no doubt that a statutory authorization of forcible entry
could satisfy fourth amendment standards. ' 77 It is possible that the
Court would not require an express authorization but merely a repeal
of the statute providing punishment for the refusal of an inspection.

271. 26 t.S.C. § 5146(b) (1964): "The Secretary or his delegate may eoter during
business hours the premises (including places of storage) of any dealer for the
purpose of inspecting or examining any records or other documents required to
Ie kept by such dealer under this chap ter or regulations issuted pursuait thereto
and any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or stored by such dealer otn such
premises."
272. 26 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (1964): Ettry dring day. "'Ilie Secretary or his delegates
nmay enter, in the daytime, any building or place where any articles or objects
stibject to tax are made, produced, or kept. so far as it may Ie necessary for the
purpose of examining said articles or objects."
(b) entry at night.
"When such premises are open at night. the Secretary or his delegate may
enter their] while so open, itt the perfirmance of his official duoties."
273. 26 t'.S.C. § 7342 (1964): -Any owner of any builditng or place, or person having
the agency or stiperintendence of the same, who refuses to admit any officer or
employee of tire Treasttiy l)epartment acting under the authority of § 7606
(relating to entry of premiscs for examina'ion of taxable articles) or refuses to
permit hiim to eamine such article ir articles, shall, for ever\' such refusal,
forfeit $500."
274. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
275. Analytically, this iiav Ile viewed as the coiiulined applicatiot of the doctrines
of in pori maeria and expiessio utius est exrusio allterius. See 2 StitUrf+t.aND,
STATUTOR'Y CONsTRUcTION §§ 5201. 4915 (1943).
276. 397 1.S. at 77.
277. "We deal here with the liquor industry long subject to close supervision and
inspection. As respect to that industry, and its various branches including retailers, Congress has iroad authority to fashion standards of reasonalileness for
searches and sCiutres.
iticle the existing statutes, Congress selected a standard
that does not include forcible entry without a warrant.
It resolved the isstte
not )), auithotiziig forcilble, warrantless entrx., but It,, imaking it attt offense for
a licensee to refuse adliiissiott to tire inspector." Id.
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Then the authority to make a forcible entry might be implied simply
2' T
8
from the authority to inspect.
9. Mail. The fourth amendment protects the unreasonable seizure
of "papers," and in Ex partc jackso1 - '27 this was recognized to apply
to papers in the ma ils.211 In United StatCs v. Van Leeuwen - 'I the
respondent placed two packages in the mail at a post office in Washington, sixty miles from the Canadian border, one addressed to the post
office box in Van Nuys, California, the other to a post office box in
Nashville, Tennessee. The parcels were sent air mail registered, insured
for $10,000 each, and it was conceded they quialified for treatment as
fitrst class ma ila.s
A postal clerk conveyed his suspicion concerning
the packages to an officer, who determined that the return address on
the packages was a vacant premises nearby, and that the respondent's
automobile bore Canadian license plates. An hour and a half after the
packages had been left at the post office it was deterinimed that the
California addressee was under investigation for trafficking in illegal
coins. Because of the time differential, the Tennessee addressee could
not be checked until the following day, at which time it was learned
that he was being similarly investigated. A customns official thereup~on
filed an affidavit for a search warrant for both packages which was
issued at 4 p.m. and executed two and a half hours later. Citing Terry
v. Oh io/-' the Cotrt found that the (irctumstances present justified the
initial detention of the )ackage.2.14 WA~hile conceding that at some point

278. It was the positioln of the dissenting Jtstices that such an aiiiltority could lbe
implied ill the present case, that the fine could not reasonably Ie understood
to be intended as the exclusive remedy to obstructionism.
-The majority views
he S5(X) fine as the Governmient's exclusive remedy for the non-cooperation of
the taxpayer. Congress could hardi
Ie so naive as to give to the licensee
the option to choose between the risk of a $500 fine against the certain discovery,
if he is in violation, of a large store of liquor subject to forfeitire. At current
prices $500 would represent four or five cases of spirits." Id. at 79.
279. 96 1 .S. 727 (1878).
280. "Letters and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from
examination and inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if
they wsere retained by the parties forwarding them in their own dotnicils. The
constitutional guaranty of the right of the people to he secure in their papers
against unreasonable searches all( sciztires extends io their papers, thts closed
against inspection, wherever they may be. W\:hile still iti the mail, they can only
he openeld and examuined under like wat arnt, issued upon similar oath or approbation, particularly describing the thing to be seized. as is required when papers
are sublected to search in one's own household.Id. at 733.
281. 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
282. See Webster v. United States, 92 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1937).
283. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2814. "1he nature and the %%eight of the packages, the fictitious address, and the
British Columbia liettse plates of respondent who made the mailings in this
border town clearly tustified delention, without a %vatrant,while aun investigation
was made.397 l'.S. at 252.
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a detention of mail could result in a fourth amendment violation, the
initial delay of one and a half hours was clearly not excessive. At that
point officers had adequate information to obtain a search warrant for

one of the parcels and the continued delay for further investigation
was not unreasonable. As neither of the packages were opened until
after a warrant had been obtained, the privacy protected by the fourth
amendment had not been disturbed. The total detention of twentynine hours, under the facts of this case, 8 5- did not violate the fourth
2 86
anendment.
10. Illegal Evidence-Impeachnent. Where evidence has been
illegally seized, it is axiomatic that it and its fruits are inadmissible at

the trial of the person whose rights were violated.
to the exclusionary rule, recognized

in

An exception

Walder v. United States, 287

permits the use of such evidence for impeachment purposes on crossexamination. A few cases 2881 have suggested that the Walder rule has
been implicitly overruled by Miranda v. Arizona.2 8
However, the continued viability of the rule was demonstrated by Birns v. Perini290 where
the testimony concerning suppressed evidence was legally introduced
for impeachnent purposes in a prosecution for a different crime.
11. Governmental Action. The protection against illegal searches
29
and seizures is inapplicable to invasions of privacy by private parties, '
absent collusion between the individual and officials.2 92
Thus in
285. "The rule of our decision certainly is not that first class mail can be detained
29 hours after mailing in order to obtain the search warrant needed for its
inspection. We only hold that on the facts of this caw . . . a 29-hour delay
between the mailings and the service of the warrant cannot be said to be
"unreasonable' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Detention for this
limited time, was, indeed, the prudent act rather than letting the packages
enter the mail and then, in case the initial suspicions were confirmed, trying
to locate them enroute and enlisting the help of distant federal officials in
serving the warrant." Id. at 253.
286. See also Chambers, J.. concurring, in the decision of the lower court, United
States v. Van Lecuwen, 414 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1969): "1 think I am as
sensitive as anyone to the Fourth Amendment in protecting one's person and
one's home.
But the detention of Van Leeuwen's 'hot money' at the post
office for 29 hours does not offend me very much. Someone in the post office
holds tp much of my mail over 29 hours."'
287. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
288. See, e.g., United States v. Mancnsi, 272 F. Supp. 261 (W.D.N.Y. 1967); People v.
Mason, 178 N.W.2d 181 (Mich. App. 1970).
But see Groshart v. United States. 393 F.2d 172, 178 n.5 (9th Cir. 1968).
289. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
290. 426 F.2d 1288 (6th Cit. 1970).
291. Burdeau v. McDowell, 25 l.S. 465 (1920): Stone v. Wingo, 416 F.2d 857 (6th
Cir. 1969).
292. See, e.g., Knoll Associates. Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 397 F.2d 530 (7th
Cir. 1968); Corngold v. U nited States 367 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1966); United States
v. Payne, 429 F.2d 169 (9th Cit. 1970).
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Luallcn v. State2 "1 no fourth amendtent p roblem was presented where
a physician gave a bullet extracted from the defendant to an official.
Similarly in United States v. Winbush2)4 items found by a hospital
employee in the defendant's pockets when he was brought to the hospital
unconscious were held admissible in evidence.
12. Harmless Error. With the possibility of harmless constitutional
error now acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court,'2 11 the
29 6
doctrine appears with increasing frequency in fourth amendment cases. 1
In Htffman v. State,"1 7 the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals applied
5the harmless eror tile to the introduction of illegally seized evidence.' 1
D. Indictment
Carter v. Jury Cornin isiOn-'"1 reaffirmed the holding of Strauder v.
West VirginiaI'l that the states are at liberty to prescribe relevant qualifications for grand jurors. Thus requirements as to citizenship, residency, age, ability to speak English, education. intelligence and good
character are not uncommon and when fairly administered are reasonable. The statute in Carter3 0t required the jury comnmissioners to select
persons for jury service who are "generally reputed to be honest and
intelligent . . . and . . . esteemed in the conmunity for their integrit,

good character and sound judgment."

Petitioners contended that this
provided the juitry commissioners with- an opportunity, which they had
ttsed, to discriminate on the basis of race. The Coutrt was disinclined to
declare the statute unconstitutional, noting that such provisions were
quite common: if the statute was being abusively employed, then it
3 '
was this practice that should be subject to condemnation. "It is not clear whether discrimination against a class in the selection
of a grand jury may be raised only by a member of that class. In Phillips
293. 453 S.W.2d 453 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
294. 428 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1970).
295. Harrington v. California, 395 ('.S. 250 (1969).
296. See United States v. Ramseur, 378 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1967): United States v.
Blackburn, 389 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1968): United States v. Nolan, 413 F.2d 850
(6th Cir. 1969): United States %. Hoffa. 307 F. SLIpI). 1129 (E.D. Tenn. 1970):
Turner v. United States, 426 F.2d 480 (6th Cir. 1970): Todey N. State. 448 S.W%.2d
683 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
297. 458 S.W.2d 29 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
298. And see Dotson v. State, 7 CRIM. 1L.RE[. 2006 (Tenn. Crim. App., Feb. 11, 1970),
holding the introduction of illegally seized cvidence harmless wherc the defendant took the stand and admitted p ossession of the disputed evidence.
299. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
300. 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
301. ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 21 (Supp. 1967).
302. And sCe T1urner v. Fouche. 396 I.S. 346 (1969). whete such an abuse was found.
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v. State3a 13 the court refused to consider the objection of a male defendant

to the exclusion of women from the grand jury. However, in Young v.
State,3 1 4 the court acknowledged the possibility of a non-black objecting

to the exclusion of Negroes from the petit jury, 30°

and presumably the

argument would be equally applicable to grand jury discrimination.

E. Right of Confrontation
1. Presence at Trial. Among the more significant decisions of the
United States Supreme Court in 1970 was Illinois v. Allen,3 16 which
concerned the disruptive defendant in the courtroom. The most elemsental aspect of the sixth amendment right to confront one's accusers
is the right of the defendant to be present at his trial. Any effort to
renove a recalcitrant defendant from the courtroom raises a potential
constitutional issue. In the Allen case, the Court held,
[A] defendant can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he
has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in
30 7
the courtroom.
The Court saw three possible solutions to the problem: "(1) bind and
gag him, thereby keeping him present; (2) cite him for contempt;
(3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to condtuct himself
properly.''a '1s The first alternative was best avoided because of its
potential prejudicial effect on the jury, "its affront to the very dignity
and decorum of the judicial proceedings," and its inhibiting effect on
the ability of the defendant to assist counsel in presenting his defense."
The second alternative enables the defendant to delay the completion of
his trial for an indefinite period, perthaps a preferable alternative where
a capital offense is charged1.3 1 1 Thus, continuing the trial in the defendant's absence may be the only practical solution to the effective
administration of justice.-""
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

458
158
See
397
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

S.W.2d 642 (Tcin. Crini. App. 1970).
SAV.2d 635 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
text accompanying notes -163-66 infra.
U.S. 337 (1970).
at 343.
at 344.

at 345.
"Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed, as soon as the
defendant is willing to conduct himself consistrently with the decorim and respect
inherent in the concept of courts and judicial proceedings." Id. at 343.
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2. Confession of Co-Defendant. Substantial litigation has been stiItmulated by Britton v. United States4 1 2 prohibiting the introduction of a
co-defendant's confession that implicates the defendant. Brutton has
generally been held inapplicable where the confessor took the stand
and was subject to cross-examinationa"I
although some courts have held
otherwise where he simply denied making the incriminating statement 314
thereby precluding effective interrogation as to the substantive content
Reconciling several inconsistent prior decisions,31t1
of the statement.3:1
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v. Simts 3 t that
where the confessor takes the stand, the right of confrontation would be
satisfied "regardless of whether the co-defendant denies or admits making
all or part of the incriminating and implicating statements.''3 :t
Courts
frequently rely on Harrington v. Californial!: in holding violations of
the Bruton rule harmless where the evidence of guilt has been overwhelming.3 - 1 In O'Neil v. State,3' 2 t no Britton error was found where
the confessions of three non-testifying co-defendants were introduced at
their joint trial, each implicating the other two as well as confessing
322
his own gUilt in the alleged robbery.
32
3. Prior Statement of Available lIWitness. In Califor)nia v. Green1
the United States Supreme Court was faced with the apl)lication of the
right of confrontation to a state statute that provided that "evidence
of a statement made by witness is not made inadnissible by the hearsay
3 24
rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing.''
The California Supreme CorIIt had previously held that whe re the witness had not been subject to cross-examination when the statement was
:
originally made, its introduction would violate the sixth amudnment. 2.,
312. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
313. United States v. Cale, 418 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1969).
314. Sutton v. State, 8 Md. App. 285, 259 A.2d 561 (1969): State %. Gardner. 54 N.J.
37, 252 A.2d 726 (1969).
315. Some courts have felt such a holding compelled by Douglas %. Alabama. 380
U. S. 415 (1965).
316. 1Townsend v. Henderson, 405 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1968); West v. Hendeison. 409
F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1968); tnited States v. Cale, 418 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1969).
317. 430 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir. 1970).
318. Id. at 1091.
319. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
320. United States v. Cale. ,18 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1969): United States v. Clayton,
418 F.2d 1274 (6th Cir. 1969): Woolen v. United States, 307 F. Supp. 80 (E.D.
Tenn. 1969).
321. 455 S.W.2d 597 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
322. "[T]his is one of the circumstances in which proper instructions hy the court
to the jury on how to receive this evidence was effective."
Id. at 663.
323. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
324. CAl. Evin. CoFr § 1235 (West 1966).
325. People v. lohnson, 68 Cal. 2d 646, -1,1 P.2d 11I, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1968), cert.
denied, 33!) U.S. 1(151 (1969).
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In the present case, the same court had held a prior statement of a
witness was equally inadmissible where made at a preliminary hearing
subject to cross-examination.32 '6 The Supreme Court held that both
decisions were ill-advised as no constitutional deprivation occurred in
either instance. The Court observed that there was a split of authority
as to whether the presentation of such evidence should be treated as
an exception to the hearsay rule, the majority view being that the prior
statements were inadmissible. The function of the Court in this case
was not to judge which evidentiary rule was preferable but to
determine whether the adoption of the minority view resulted in a
denial of the right of confrontation. The primary vice at which the
protection was directed was the failure to call the witness to personally
testify in the presence of the accused. While an out-of-court statement
may have been made under circumstances that prevented the securing
of the traditional purposes of confrontation, placing the witness on
the stand in the present hearing would go far to obviate any
prejudice resulting from the introduction of the prior statement. The
witness may be subject to cross-examination, and his demeanor may
be observed by the jury. Indeed- the very nature of the context in
which the issue will arise-the introduction by the prosecution of a prior
inconsistent statement-renders the witness presently sympathetic to the
defendant.327 The Court further observed that none of its previous
decisions required the exclusion of prior statements where the witness
was available to testify at trial. 32" Thus, the Couirt concluded, irrespective of whether the witness had been subjected to cross-examination at
the time the proffered statement was initially made, his present subjection to cross-examination fully l)rotected the right of confrontation.
326. People v. Green, 70 Cal. 2d 654, 451 P.2d 422, 75 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969).
327. "The most successful cross- examination at the time the prior statement was
made could hardly hope to accomplish more than has already been accomplished
I he fact that the witness is now tellifig a different inconsistent story, andini this case-one that is favorable to the defendant .... The main danger in
substituting subsequent for timely cross-examination seens to lie in the possibility that the witness' '[flalse testimony is apt to harden and become unyielding
to the blows of truth in proportion as the witness has opportunity for reconsideration and influence by the suggestion of others, whose interest may be,
and often is, to maintain falsehood rather than truth.' State v. Saporen, 205
Minn. 358, 362, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939). That danger, however, disappears
when the witness has changed his testimony so that, far from 'hardening,' his
prior statement has softened to the point where he now repudiates it."
399
I.S. at 159.
328. "The concern of most of our cases has been focused on precisely the opposite
situation-situations where statements have been adimitted in the absence of the
declarant and without any change to cross-examine him at trial. Id, at 161.
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While the issue presented in the case only required the Court to
determine the admissibility of such prior statement where an inconsistency arose, in the final analysis the Court explicitly sanctioned, for
constitutional purposes, the introduction of prior statements of a testifying witness even where they were wholly consistent with his present
2
testimony.a 9
F. Right to Counsel
I. Pro se. While an accused has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at least in all felony casesa a 1 there would appear to be
a correlative constitutional right to no counsel-a right to defend
pro se.aas In United States v. Conder33 - the court observed, however,
that the defendant "should not be pern-itted to manipulate his choice
so that he can claim reversible error on app)eal no matter what alternative he apparently chose."aaa In that case for an extended period prior
to trial the defendant had been represented by counsel. After the trial
commenced, he for the first time indicated that he wished personally
to make objections. The trial court refused )ermission at this time
but indicated it would consider a further application for permission
to participate in the defense. No such application was made, nor did
the defendant seek to discharge his attorney.
The court held that
the defendant had not been improperly denied the right to defend
himself.
2. Identification Procedures. While United States v. Wadeaa4 and
Gilbert v. California a 3;, established the right to counsel during pre-trial
line-up identifications,336 the Court did not preclude a valid in-court
identification following an improper line-up but held that in such
instances the prosecution would have "to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications were based upon obser329. "As in the case where the witness is physically unproducible, the State here
has made every effort to introduce its evidence through the live testimony of
the witness; it produced Porter at trial, swore him as a witness, and tendered
him for cross-examination.
Whether Porter then testified in a manner consistent or inconsistent with his preliminary hearing testimony, claimed a loss
of memory, claimed his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, or simply
refused to answer, nothing in the Confrontation Clause prohibited the State
from also relying on his prior testimony to prove its case against Green." Id.
at 167-68.
330. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
331. Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269 (1942). See Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1233 (1961).
332. 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1970).
333. Id. at 908.
334. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
335. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
336. See also 1969 Survey at 485-87.
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vations of the suspect other than the line-up identification.''" 3 7 This
exception is relied upon with increasing frequency in .upholding courtroom identifications.3 3 18 In Stovall v. Denno3 . the Wade and Gilbert
decisions were held not to apply retroactively. Still, the Court held,
in such instances it was possible that the confrontation was "so Unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification
that [the suspect] was denied clue process of law." 3 4" This standard
was re-affirmed by the Court in Coleman v. Alabama.3 4 1 A substantially
identical test was employed in Simmons v. United States3 42 in respect
to pre-trial identification of the accused through the use of photographs.
43
Subsequent courtroom identifications are frequently sustained.a
3. Effective Assistanie. The alleged denial of effective assistance
44
of counsel has been the subject of increasing litigation in recent years.
Where the defendant challenges the tactics or strategy of trial counsel,
courts are chary to find ineffective assistance,3 45 so long as counsel did
not reduce the proceedings to "a farce and a mockery of justice shocking
to the conscience of the coUrt.''a 4 6t Nor will the late appointment of
counsel result in constitutional error absent a showing of actual prejudice.a 4 7 A defendant will not be allowed to claim prejudice when he,
fo disrtuptive putrposes, attempts to discharge his counsel at the beginning of the trial.3 45 1 Tennessee decisions continue to hold :' -'!' that where
counsel is retained the issue of his effective assistance cannot arise because
there is no state action.351o

337. 388 t'.S.at 240.
338. Raynor v. State, 447 S.W.2d 391 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969); Campbell v. State,
447 S.V.2d 877 (1Tenn. Crim. App. 1969); Herman v. State, 453 S.W.2d 421
(Temn. Crim. App. 1969).
339. 388 1.S. 293 (1967).
34). Id. at 30)2.
311. 399
.S.1 (197)).
In both Stovall and Coleman the result was to sustain the validity of the
in-cout identification. This has been the result in the overwhelming majority
of Ioer conurt cases involk ing the issue.
3-12.390 V.S. 377 (1968).
343. 1 nited States %. L.aker, 427 F.2d 189 (6th Cir. 1970): U nited States %. Winiger,
427 F.2d 1128 (6th Cir. 1970).
34-1.See 1968 Survey at 250-51; 1969 Survey at 482-84.
345. Whitsell v. Perini, 419 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1969): Williams v. Russell, 419 F.2d
1092 (6th Cir. 1969): McFerren v. State, 449 S.V.2d 724 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
316. Holnagel v. Kropp. 426 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1970) (dicta). See also Andrews
v. Russell. 451 S.V.2d 704 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969) (dicta); Weddle v. State,
453 S.W.2d 426 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969) (dicta).
347. Callahan v. Russell, 423 F.2d 450 (6th Cir. 1970).
348. State v. Chadwick. 450 S.W%.2d 568 (Tenn. 1970).
349.'ee 1968 .Smurvev at 251: 1969 Survey at 482.
350. Carvin v. State. 452 S.\V.2d 681 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970): Floyd v. State, 453
S.V.2d 418 (1ctm. Crim. App. 1970). But see Goodwin v. Cardwell, 432 F.2d
521

(6th (:it-.

1970)).
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The right to counsel at all critical stages of the proceeding includes
the time at which the jury's verdict is returned. 351 In United States v.
Clayton3. 52 upon the return of the jury the trial judge discovered that
defense counsel was not present. He advised the defendant of his right
to the presence of counsel, and counsel for the co-defendant responded
that defendant had agreed to his representation for the return of the
verdict. The defendant confirmed this understanding. The appellate
court found the procedure acceptable.
A defendant may be denied effective assistance of counsel where
his interests are inconsistent with those of a co-defendant represented
by the same counsela 5 :2 but joint representation does not per se result
in a conflict of interest. a t 4 In United States v. Calea35'
the defendant
and her husband were represented by the same counsel at a joint trial.
A pre-trial statement of the husband was read to the jury, defense counsel
expressly stating that he had no objection. The statement, while exculpating the husband, implicated the defendant, and she contended that
the conflict of interest aligned counsel's efforts with her husband and
thereby denied her effective assistance. The court held that since the
husband specifically denied the portion of the statement implicating
the defendant, as did she herself, there was in fact no conflict of
interest.3 6 The analysis is not entirely satisfactory, because the denial
of the truth of the statement by the husband did not necessarily serve
to neutralize its effect upon the jury. Certainly if counsel had been
representing defendant alone he wotld have no reason to wish the
statement to come before the jury. Two factors lend Support to the
result: First, counsel was retained and thus the parties could be said
to have assumed the risk of a possible conflict of interest. Second, in
the context of the right of confrontation,3 57 the cott found the introduction ot the statement harnless.
By virtue of the decision in Anders v. California,3 a' a demanding
standard must be satisfied for effective assistance of appointed counsel on
ap peal. If counsel elects to withdraw from a case, considering appeal
351. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 411 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1969). Discussed in
1969 Survey at 483-84.
352. 418 F.2d 1274 (6th Cir. 1969).
353. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
354. United States v. Martinez, 428 F.2d 86 (6th Cir. 1970); Morain %. State, 457
S.W.2d 886 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
355. 418 F.2d 897 (6th Cir. 1969).
356. Cf. Morain v. State, 457 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970): "A single

attorney may find his effectiveness impaired when he represents one defendant
who denies his guilt and a co-defendant who not only confesses
plicity but also accuses the other of participating in the crime."
357. See text accompanying notes 312-22 supra.
358. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). See 1969 Survey at 252-53.

his own cons
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futile, he should seek leave to do so from the trial judge in order that
new counsel may be appoin-ted.3a5
Clearly a failure to advise the
defendant of his right to appeal is inadequate assistancea3o
G. Self-Incrimrinati0n
1. Comment ori Failtre to Testify. The accutsed in a criminal trial
has a privilege under the fifth amendment not to testify. If he elects
to exercise this privilege, he may not be penalized for doing so by
comment by the prosecution or trial court which tends to inculpate
him because of his decision.a t" Such comment may result by implication
as well as be explicit. For example, in Huckaby v. State a-3 2 the defendant
was convicted of burglary, and at his trial incriminating inferences had
been drawn fronm his unexplained possession of a stolen check. In his
closing argument, the prosecutor rhetorically asked the members of the
jury what they would have done had the) come into innocent possession

of the check, and then provided the response: "You could have coute
in here and said 'Why I got the check from Jim Jones or John Smith.' 'a6:
The court held that tie comment was improper and constituted reversible er ror.3 4 Itnoted, however, that the injury might have been cured
In Un ited
by a proper admonition by the triial judge to the jur y.6
States v. l/ellsase the court found that the observation of the prosecutor
that a co-conspirator to the crime had confessed his gillilt
did not
atiount to a comment on the failure to testifv.aee1

359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Benoit v. Vingo, 423 F,2d 880 (6th Cir. 1970).
Goodwin v. Cardwell, 432 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1970) (retained counsel).
Griffin %. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
457 SV.2d 872 (Tenn. Cijot. App. 1970).
Id. at 873.
"The clear import of the ahove arguinmen t is that since defendant did not testify
lie obtained the check from i third party the jury was justified iindrawing
an unfavorable conclusion from his failing to to what they woUld have done
if innocent. Of course, it might be difficult for a jury not to draw such an
inference or presumption in spite of the law in this State discouraging same,
but this difficult
is greatly increased when the failure to testify is emphasized
ill argumen t.
1M.
365. -Perhaps if the judge had gone flither and instructed the jur to disregard
the comments of the District Attoiney General, and particularly if lie had so
admonished tihejury at the time of the arg, nient when the comment was called
to his atlention we could find that the error was rendered harmless or cured.
But the trial jidge (lid neither. lInstead, lie approved the argument and overruled
the objection, therehy indicating w%,ithl tile
argument was proper."
1d. at 874.

weight

of

his

judgment

that

such

See also United States v. Banks, 426 F.2d 292 (lih Cir. 1970).
366. 431 F.2d 434 (6th Cir. 1970).
367. "The comment of government consel focused on tile credibility of Jackson and
dlidnot emphasize appellant's failue to testify."Id. at 436. In any event, the
court felt lie instruction gisen to the jury provided sufficient prtectiin of
the defendant's lights.
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2. Civil Interrogatoris. In United States v. Kordel a 6s the potentially
self-incriminating effect of responses to civil interrogatories came before
the United States Supreme Court.nas Suspecting violations of federal
laws, a libel was filed against the corporation of which respondents were
officers and extensive interrogatories were served on the corporation.
Subseqtuently the corporation and the individual respondents received
notice, required by statute,a37 of contemplated criminal proceedings
against them. The corporation moved to stay further proceedings in
the criminal action or, alternatively, to extend the time allowed to respond tntil after the disposition of the criminal proceedings. Nowhere in
its motion did it raise the privilege against self-incrimination. The motion
was denied and tile corporation, thirough respondent Feldten, answered
the interrogatories. The respondents were subseqtuently convicted for
violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,a7 and it was assumed
that the responses to the interrogatories had contributed to the case
for the prosecution. The lower court had determined that the responses
had been involtntarily given, because the respondents had but three
choices: (1) reftse to answer, thereby forfeiting the corporations property; (2) answer falsely, thereby making themselves vulnerable to a
charge of perjury; or (3) answer the questions tiuthfuflly , as they (lid,
thereby incriminating themselves.
The Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals had overlooked a fourth alternative: Respondent Feldten could have invoked
his personal privilege against self-incrimination. The corporation itself
"
could not assert the privilege, 72
and there was no assertion that no
authorized person could respond to the interrogatories without incrimi-

nating himself.a a The Court distinguished cases in which the civil
action might be biought solely to obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution and cases in which tile defendant was not advised of the contemT 4
plated criminal chairges.a
3. Failure to Comply with Stat utc. Tihe possibility of' self-incrimina368. 397 U.S. 1 (1970).

369. The lower court holding in this case, stNled United States \. Detioit Vital Foods,
Inc., 407 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1969), ih discussed in 1969 S5mey at 462.

370. 21 U.S.C. § 335 (1938).
371. Id. § 301 ct seq.
372. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U .S. 43 (1906).
373. The argument of respondent
aiim
of the ii terrogatories.

Kordel

was e\ci

weaker, as he (lid not answer

374. "Overiurning hese coinictions wouhl Ie iantamoun to the adoption of a rule
[hait he (;omernme 's use of interrogatories directed against the corporate defcndaii in the ordinar course of a civil proceeding would always immunize the
corporalioos officers fioio subsecquen criminal piosciition." 397 t'.S. at 12-13.
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tion resulting from complying with a statutory mandate continued to
be a source of frequent litigation during the past year. 3 7 5 In Minor v.
United States376 the United States Supreme Court considered in this
context provisions of the Marijuana Tax Act 3 77 and the Harrison Narcotics Act3"78 which made it illegal to transfer marijuana except ptrsuant
to a written order of the transferee on a form obtained at the time he
pays the transfer tax. The order form required the names of both the
buyer and the seller. It was contended that if the seller complied with
the statute by requiring the form as a condition of a sale he would
thereby incriminate himself. The Court was skeptical that the procedure
involved self-incrimination at all,3t 1" but avoiding this issue observed
that there was no "real and substantial possibility" that the purchaser
would be willing to comply with the statute, and therefore the danger
of self-incrimination by the seller was remote "," As regards legitimate
purchasers who would have no qualms about procuring and using the
order forms, the Court said it would appear highly unlikely that such
t
persons would turn to an illegal seller to fill their orders.8'
Reconciling a split of authority among federal district courts in
Tennessee,3 11 United States v. Whitchead :53
1' held that compliance with
certain federal alcohol tax laws S54 did not present a problem of self-

375. See also 196S Survey at 236; 1969 Survey at 460-61.
Leary v. United States,
395 1'.S.6 (1969), was given prospective application only in Houser v. United
States, 426 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1970).
376. 396 U.S. 87 (1970).
377. 26 t.S.C. § 4742(a) (1954).
378. 26 It.S.C. § 4705(a) (1954).
379. *'The ohligation to furnish the necessary information is in terms placed on the
buyer: while his compliance with that obligation may 'inform' on the seller, it
would not ordinarily be thought to result in the latter's "self-incrimination.'
396 U.S. at 91 n.3.
380. "We have great difficulty in heliesing, and nothing in this record convinces us,
that one who wishes to purchase marijuana will comply with a seller's request
that he incriminate himself with federal and local authorities and pay .$100 per
ounce in taxes in order to secure the order form. The possihility is particularly
unlikely in view of the fact that the Fifth Amendment relieves unregistered
buyers of any duty to pay the transfet tax and secure the incriminating order
form. Leacy v. United States, 395 '.S. 6 (1969)."
Id. at 92.
381. And sce United States v. Black, 431 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1970), applying the Minor
rationale to a charge of possessing an onregistered firearm.
382. United States v. MtcGee, 282 F. Supp. 550 (M.). Tenn. 19i68): United States v.
Fine, 293 F. Sutpp. 189 (E.D. Tenn. 1968). See 1969 Survey at 460-61.
383. 424 F.2d 446 (6th Cir. 1970).
384. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5173 (a), 5601 (a) (4), 5205 (a) (2), 5179 (a), 56(11 (a) (1). 5222 (a) (7), 5601
(a) (7). 5178 (a) (I) (B), 5601 (a) (6), 5180 (a), 5681 (c) (1954).
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incrt ina tion, primarly because they were not "directed at a highly
" 5
selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.''
In United Stales v. Knox386 the defendant was charged with failing
to comply with federal gambling laws, but the charges were later dropped
by virtue of Marchetti v. United States.a s 7 However, one charge was
prosecuted, that dealing with knowing and wilfully making a fraudulent
statement to a federal agency. a s s The defendant contended that since
he was not required to give the information at all, per Marchetti, he
could not be prosecuted for giving false information. The Court found
Marchetti immaterial to the charge, holding that
one who ftrnishes false information to the government in feigned
compliance with a statutory requirement cannot defend against
p1rosecution 3alot: his frtand by challenging the validity of the requirement itself. 1
The Marchetti rationale provides a viable claim of self-incrimination
to the failure to conply with a statute under particular circumstances.
It does not go to the constitutionality of the statutes involved but merely
to the prosectitability of the particular defendant.
It follows that
Marchetti is not relevant to the validity of a search seeking evidence
of the violation of such a statute.a1 1'
This is particularly true, as illstrated by United Slateas v. Tiktin,'"1 where the search occurred prior to
92
the decision of Marchetti and conpanion cases.3
39' 4
4. Confessions. a. Voluntary. Pre-Escobedoa3 " and Miranda
confession cases required a de facto determination of the involutariness of
the self-incriminating utterances8a 5 However, even where the Miranda

385. The language is taken frot Albertson %. Subver5 sive Activities Control Board,
382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965), and appeared as a critical factor in the first of the series
of cases on the problem, Marchetti v. t nited States. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
McCree. Circuit Judge, joined b) O'Sullivan, Senior Circuit Judge, dissent.
ing in part. contended that this factor could not be determinative when there
was an appreciable clanger of self-incrimination, as there was under certain of
the statutes Iefore the court.
See also t.*tited States v. Boyd, 422 F.2d 791 (6th Cir. 1970); Lnited States
v. Ball, 428 F.2d 26 (6th Cir. 1970).
386i. 396 t'.S. 77 (1969).
387. 39X) t .S.39 (1968).
388. 18 1'.S.C. § 1001 (1948).
38). 396 I*.S. at 79. The Coort cited Bryson v.
nited States, 396 II.S. 64 (1969),
reaffirming I)ennis %,. 'nited States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966), otl this point. Followed
Postell v. United States, 429 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1970).
390. State v. Gerado, 53 N.J. 261, 250 A.2d 130 (1969); State v. Sellars, 448 SAV.2d 595
(Mo. 1969). But see Silbert 7. United States, 282 F. Supp. 635, 289 F. Supp. 318
(D. Md. 1968); Commonwealth %. Katz, 429 Pa. 406, 240 A.2d 809 (1968).
"391. 427 F.2d 1027 (6th Cir. 1970).
392. See also Utited States Ni. One 1965 Buick, 397 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1968).
393. Escobedo %-.Illinois, 378 1 .S. 478 (1964).
394 Miranda v. Arizona. 384 t.S. 436 (1966).
395. See Jordan \. Cardwell. -128 F.2d 325 (6th Cir. 1970).
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warnings are given, an issue may still arise as to whether the confession
of the defendant was voluntary a4i)
In McGee v. State,3" 7 following a
Miranda waiver, the defendant was interrogated by an officer who misrepresented the evidence which the state had against him. He was told
that a polygraph test had revealed he was lying, that blood had been
found on his clothing and that his fingerprints were found at the scene
of the crime. Citing Frazier v. Cnpp,398 where a sinilar argument was
made, the court concluded that the totality of circumstances did not
4
render the confession involuntary.3
"9

b. Sponlanceons Uttcrantmcs. No Mirandda warnings are necessary
where the incriminating statement may properly be described as a spontaneous titterance. In Ballard v. United Stales4 0 an officer arrived at
the scene of a murder, found the defendant standing near the gun, and
asked what happened. The defendant responded, "I shot her." The
4
court held the statement admissible. 01
c. Custodial Interrogalion. 'he protections of il\iranda are applicable to custodial interrogation. Escobedo spoke in teris of an investigation focusing on the at cttsed. 4 2' In Stait( v. Morris40a the defendant
was injured in an automobile accident and taken to a hospital for treatmeni. NVhile he was, according to a patrolman, bloody and "real shook
lip," he was asked qutlestions for the accident report and admitted that
lie had been driving and had drunk three or four beers. He was not
advised of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to cotunsel
prior to making these statenents. The court held that the defendant
was not in custody and the statements were admissible." 4
In Uniled
Slalt(s v. CorlCz 4. 0 . the court fomtidl the Aliraida wa,,n
w
rigs inieeded where

396. See Sullins v. Stale, 448 S.V.2d 96 (Teinn. ( it.
App. 1969): Vaughn v. State,
,456 S.V.2d 87!9
''eom. Crim. App. 1970).
'397. 451 S.V.2d 709 ('Teunn. Crim. App. 1969).
398. 31-1I,S. 731 (1969).
3! o.
hI'liecourt appai ently ga\s
i44) cc eld
ctc to tileassertion of the defendanl.t
Ihat
e had been thrcatened with a
1ubaiud a bell I)' tie irterl-ogaor.
-100. 15.1S.V.2d 193 (Tenn.Clit. App. 1969).
,101.The trial
4o4lli
had excluded this statement but alld itte( a stub)sequent sitilcnet
following A!liroda warnings which (tic defendant contended was the product
of the first. The Court cited People \. Quicke, 71 Cal. 2d 502, -155 P.2d 787,
78 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1969), and Slae v. Barnes 5-1 N.J. I. 252 A.2d 398 (1969).
,112. A1ira4d suggested that thie siitlards were equivalent.
4 03. -156 S.W.2d 8,10(1len. 1970).

404. -[T]he fine line of distinction betweeni the investigatory stage and tile
accusatory
stage had not4 been crossed, for evell thourgh Morris voliintar iiy went outside
tihe hospital to tile patrlmthan's -at at the time lie was iterv.iewed, it does t1nL
seemt that the (.its with which Ntirju ti was concerned \t' r present." Id. at 843.
4t05.-125 F.2d -153 (6It Cir. 1970).
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the individual voluntarily ac:coinpanied the officer to the station for
4
purposes of interrogation. ""
d. Method of Advisitig of Rights. Miratida requiles that, absent a
suitable alternative, "[p]rior to any qiestioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
The
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.'4'4
stispec t inust be adequately apprised of these rights before he can effectively waive them. 4 118 In Carter v. StatC4 09 the court held that it was not
essential that the warnings be given orally to the suspect. While it is
true that Miranda does not compel oral advisement of rights, and no
allegation was made here of the inability of the suspect to read, Miranda
does hold that the signing of a waiver by a defendant does not conelusively demonstrate a waiver of constitutional rights. In the present
case, the suspect had a copy of the warnings, according to the court,
"for about 22 minutes, appeared to read it 'or about all the way through
it' and then voluntarily signed the written waiver.''411 The ambiguousness of this factual determination points emphatically to the desirability
of oral warning to preclude any lingering doubt whether the suspect
4
has been exposed to them. ''
In Mitchell v. Stale 4 12 the proof showed that the defendant had effectively waived his rights on one day, but the incriminating statements
were not obtained until the following day, prior to which the warnings
had not been repeated. The court found the previous warnings sufficient to support the admissibility of the confession. \Vhile there are
decisions from other Jir isdictions consistent with this result, 4 1 3 there is
language in Miranda that suggests that subsettiLuent warnings may be
necessa ry.414
4116. See prior discussion, iext accompanyiiig notes 176-79 supra.
See also Itndcrwvood v. State, 8 CR1M. L,. Rr-'. 2065 (Term. Crim. App., Oct. 5,
1970), where qIicstioning in judge's chambers of suspect regarding alleged incest
wvith daughter wvas hel custodial interrogation.
,407. Miranda v. Arizona, 38,4 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).

interrogation (-al1 he recognized
effectise waiver of the right to Ctoinsel dIing
uless specifically made after the warnings we here delineate have been given."
Id. at 470.
-1,17 SA\V.2d 115 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
Id. at 117 (emphasis supplied).
See also McGee v. State, 451 S.W.2d 719 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969). where an
effective waiver was found. oer a Vigorotins dissent.
458 S.W.2d 630 (Teni. Crim. App. 1970).
Se' Maguire \. U nited States, 396 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1968): Stale \. Magee, 52 N.J.
352, 245 A.2d 339 (1968).
E.g.. "'The mere fact that 1ie may have answered sonic qunest ions or volunteered
SOIUle slatlellts oil his ovns does llot deprive himu, of the right io refrain from
answeling ans filher inquiries uuntil Ile has cousulted With an attorney and

,1)8. 'No

409.
410.
411.
412.
'I13.
4 1I.
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e. Harmless Error. Occasionally courts acknowledge the presence
of a violation of Miranda but nevertheless conclude that the error was
harmless. 41 5 In Carter v. State 4 1 i a conviction was affirmed where the
defendant was not advised that an attorney would be appointed if he
could not afford one, but the proof showed that he was not an indigen t.41 7
f. Governmental Action. The privilege against self-incrimination,
as all other bill of rights protections, is directed at the conduct of agents
of the government. In Frcshwater v.State-4 18 the defendant, under indictment for murder, made certain incriminating statements to an inmate
who later was called to testify against her at her trial. Citing Massiah
v. United States, 4 11 she contended that the post-indictment self-incrininating statements could not be used against her. In Massiah a conspirator
was induced by the government to conceal a microphone in a vehicle
occupied by himself and the defendant and permit the recordings of
nm incrininating
c
utterances which the defendant might make. The
Court found the statements inadmissible because elicited after indictment and in the absence of counsel.
In the present case the court
properly distinguished AIassia/, because here there was no prior collusion
between the informant and the police, and therefore the gaining of the
incriminating statements could not be characterized as governtnental
action.
H. Guilty Pleas
The subject of stibstantial litigation during the previotus year was
4
the effectiveness of' pleas of guilty. In McMann v. Richardso -') the
United States Supreme Court was concerned with the validity of a guilty
thereafter consents to Ie qu+stiond." 384 U.S. at 4415. "()pportutity to exercise
these rights [)litst he afforded to hitlt thooUghottt the interrogation." /d. at 479.
And see )wyer, J.,dissenting, in the present case.
In Sexton \. State, 7 CRIM. L. REP. 2017 (Tein. Crim. App., Fell.27, 1970),
the officer testified. "I advised them of their rights and told them that anything
that tihe\said would ite used against them. They had a right to remain silent.
They had a tight to an attotttm'. And the\, wouldn't he forced. threatened,
haritted or anythitg. But if they "did sav anything from that point oti, it \vould
'
tie tse(iagailst thet
at a Ia+2r tt iati. A t ie tite lhteseaimotitiols were
givet tile defemtdant was lying face down ott the ground at gun-point, being
hatdcuffed IN other officets.
Iie cottrt fotttd titewarnings inadequate and
mhe waivers not knowingly madhe. (;al)re+ath. J., thissente,tontetdittg that
the record indicated(htiat tie defendant was futilly
aware of his rights.
,tl5.

c, /909 Suo

4 16. 447
-117..See
310
4118.
-53
I19.377
-120. 397

l at ,189-90.

S.W.2d 11.) (Tenn.C itt. App. 1969).
also \ hitseliv. Perini. -119 F.2d 95 (6th Cit. 1969):
F. Supp. 841 (E.). Temn. 1969).
SA.2d 4t6 (Temn. Cim\. .\pp. 1969).
1.S. 201 (196-1).
1'.S.751) (1970).

tnited States %. Hall,
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4 21
plea which "is shown to have been triggered by a coerced confession.''
The lower court had held that the inducement rendered the guilty plea
invalid. The Suptreme Court disagreed. The fact that a confession may
have been coerced did not mean the guilty plea was also coerced.

[H]is plea is at most a claim that the admissibility of his confession was mistakenly assessed and that since he was erroneously
advised, either under the then applicable law or under the law
later announced, his plea was an unintelligible and voidable act.
The Constitution, however, does not render pleas of guilty so
vulnerable.4"2
No- could the failur e of counsel to correctly evaluate the admissibility

4
of evidence provide a sufficient basis for invalidating a guilty plea. 3'
If counsel provided "reasonably competent advice ' 42 4 the defendant
will not later be heard to complain.
The Richardson decision was followed in Parkerv. North Carolina.42 ,
While the psychic ti atnia caused by an illegally induced confession could
conceivably improperly induIce a guilty plea entered a short time thereafter, such could not he argued in the present case where a period of a
month elapsed before a plea of guilty was made, during which time the
defendant had the advice of counsel.
Both Parker and Brady v. United Staes4 2 " i raised questions as
427
to the dimensions of the 1968 decision. Un ited States v. Jackson,

where the Court had held that a statutory scheme which subjected a
defendant to a potential death penalty only if he was tried by a jury
impro
p
rly penalized hint for electing to exercise his sixth amendment
right to trial by jury. Brady had entered a guilty plea under the statutes
invalidated by lackson; Parker had plead guilty under a comparable
state statute. The court found both pleas valid.
Jackson ruled neither that all pleas of guilty encouraged by the
fear of a possible death sentence are involuntary pleas nor that
such encouraged pleas are invalid whether involuntary or not. 4"2
The Gourt found in Brady that there was substantial motivation other
thai the statute for the defendant to plead guilty. Nothing was found
421. Id. at 766.

422. 1d. at 769.
And sec Adams v. Russcll. 452 S.\.2d 688 (Tenn. Cirim. App. 1969).
,123. "That this Court might hold a defendant's confession inadmissible

in evidence,

possi)lyIby a divided vote, hardly justifies a conclusion that the defendant's
attoley was incompetent or ineffective where lie thought the admissibility of
t11C colfCssiOni sLIffiCiCu1ly probable to advise ta plea of guil .'"/d. at 770.
42-1.Id.

425. 397 I'.S.
790 (1970).
,126. 397 I.S. 742 (1970).
427. 390 t'.S.570 (1968).
428. Brady \. t'nited States, 397 t S. at 7-17.
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in Parker to render it distinguishable. These decisions would appear
to go a long way in diminishing the impact of the Jackson decision by
apparently limiting it to cases in which avoidance of more severe punishment is the sole or at the very least the overwhelming motivation for
entering a plea of guilty.
In North Carolina v. Alford429 the Court went a step further in
making guilty pleas increasingly impregnable by declining to recognize
any significance in the statements of the defendant at the time he
entered the plea that he was not in fact guilty bu,t was pleading guilty
to a lesser charge to avoid the death penalty. 4a
Particularly disconcerting in the Alford case is the emphasis placed by the Court on "the
overwhelming evidence" pointing to the defendant's guilt. The hearing
on the guilty plea could hardly be typified as an adversary hearing,
as there would he little reason for defense counsel to challenge the
prima facie case for the prosecution. The apparent informality of the
proceeding is suggested by the Court's reference to "the sworn testimony
of a police officer who summarized the State's case.'' 43 1 The effectiveness of guilty pleas has not turned upon the strength of the evidence
for the prosecUtion, 4 2 as it should not, because of the impossibility of
distinguishing self-serving declarations frtom evidence which would have
been admitted had the defendant stood trial. Since the Court in Alford
could have resolved the case without resort to such information, its
incorporation into the opinion is unfortunate.
I. Speedy Trial
The sixth amendment accords to an accused the right to a speedy
trial. \Vhile no arbi trary limits may be placed on this constitutional
protection, Smith v. Hooey433 held that if an inordinate delay was
materially prejudicial to the accused, and the prosecution had failed to
make a good faith effort to bring him to trial, his conviction would be
429. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
430. "That he woul(l not have pleadled except for the opportunity to limit the possible
penalty does not necessarily demonstrate that the plea of guilty was not the
product of a free and rational choice, especially where the defendant was represented b% competent counsel whose advice was that the plea would he to the
defendant's alvantage."
Id. at 31.
And see Shepard v. Henderson, 449 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969);
State ex tel. Wyatt v. Henderson, 453 S.\V.2d 434 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969);
Lawrence v. State, 455 S.W.2d 680 ('Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
431. 400 U.S. at 28.
432. "An accused, after pleading guilty. cannot ordinarily raise the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence." McFerreu v. State, 449 S.AV.2d 724, 725 (Tenn. Crimn.
App. 1969). See also Ray v. State, 451 SAV.2d 854 (Tenn. 1970).
433. 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
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void. Such a delay was found in Dic)key v. Florida4 4 where the accused
was not tried until eight years after the alleged criminal acts, although
he had been available continuously. In the intervening periodihe had
made repeated efforts to secure a trial, two defense witnesses had died
and others were no longer available, and certain official records of
possible relevance had been lost or destroyed. The Court found a denial
of the right to a speedy trial.
The Smith case clearly indicated that the fact the defendant was serving a sentence for another crime, even in another ju,risdiction, would
not per se show that he was unavailable, thus justifying a delay. In
Edmaiston 7. Ste. 4:35 as in Dickey, at least eight years had elapsed
between the alleged crime and the trial, and two defense witnesses had
tied. Unfortunately for the defendant, he was convicted seven days
prior to the release of the Smith decision. 4:1 ; Thus the court, applying
the standard enunciated in Burton v. Slate,4 3 7 concluded that as the
delay was caused by his own acts-"commission and imprisonment for
crinies"-he had not been deprived of a speedy trial.
4a
Applying the Smith standard, the court in Bennett 7. SItate ' found
the state had made a good faith effort to try the defendant where two
extradition attempts had been unsuccessful, and offenses seven years
p1rev'ious could be prosecuted.
.1.Jurisdiction
In Shaw v. StaIC4: 9 the defendant contended that he was denied
various constitutional rights in the process of his extradition from
Indiana to Tennessee. 44 " Relying upon Frisbec v. Collins,4 4 1 the court
held that power to try a person is not impaired by the manner in which
4 "jurisdiction was obtained.
434. 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
43.5. 152 SA.2d 677 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
136. Theic has been no indication that Smith is to
i)e
applied rctioactively.
437. 214 Te nn. 9, 377 S.\.2d 900 (1964).
438. -153 S.V.2d 430 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
4t39. 4157 SAV.2d 875 (Teinn. Crim. App. 1970).
440. "[l-]c alleges tha tic was forced to sign a waivcr of' extradition from Indiana
to Tennessee in
iolation of his constitntional rights, that he was arrested in
Indiana on a federal warrant charging flight to avoid prosecution but was not
arrested In federal officers: that he was not turneld over to a federal officer
afier arlesi: that tiewas never taken before a judge, magistrate. or commissioner
before being retiiried to Iieicllesscc; and ihat lie was not afforded conllsel ill
Indiana." Id. at 8763.
441. 3-12 U.S. 519 (1952).
nirvey at -170-71.

-1-12. See 1969
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K. Fair Trial
1. Change of Venue. The granting of a change of venue to avoid
the impact of adverse pre-trial )ublicity is largely a matter within the
discretion of the trial court, although it is clear that an abuse of discre443
tion can result in a denial of the constitutional right to a fair trial.
]n Tennessee a change of venue is permitted by statute upon a showing
of "undue excitement against the prisoner in the county where the
offense was committed.'' 44 4 The denial of a change of venue was sustained
445
in two decisions during the previous year.
2. Prior Ideii ication of lWitnesses. In Bra) v. State 44 ", the defense
called a witness whose testimony was objected to by the prosecutor
because her name had not been given prior to the impaneling of the
jury so that prospective jurors could be questioned concerning possible
knowledge or acquaintance with witnesses to testify. The objection
WaS sustained, and the witness was not permitted to testify. On appeal
the conviction was reversed, the court noting that there was no legal
requirement that the defendant divulge the names of all witnesses he
intended to call prior to the taking of evidence. As there was nothing
in the record indicating the anticipated substance of the testimony of
the witness, the court could not assume the error was harmless. While
not examined in this context, the issue is closely related to the right
under the sixth amendment "to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses' in the defendant's favor. In Ezell v. Stale 44 7 the court held
that the failure of a witness to comply with a court order to remain
without the courtroom until he was called to testify, at least where he
had not been piroperly informed by the trial judge, could not be used
448
to penalize the defendant by denying him the testimony of the witness.
3. Prrscllre of I)fJendant. Fu1ndamental to the right to a fair trial,
as well as to the right to confront one's accusers, 44:1 is the presence of
ihe accused at his trial. \,Vhile not desirable, Illinois v. Alle'n45. recog
nized that in certain circumstances binding and gagging the defendant

4-13.. Sce Irwin \. Dowd. 366 t'.S. 717 (1961): RidCaul v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963);
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 t.S. 333 (1966).
-14. "1E.\N. Colw ANN. § 40-2201 (1955).
'145. Iiuallen v. State, 453 S.AV.2d '153 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969); Lang v. State, 457
S.A.2d 882 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
See also Unidil

States v. Rtbino. 431

F.2d 281

Neil, 317 F. Supp. 959 (M.). Tenn. 1970).
416. -150 S.W.2d 786 (Tenn. Grin1. App. 1969).
,147. '2210 Tenn. 11, 413 S.V.2d 678 (1967).
448. See also State v. Ieong, -165 P.2d 560 (Hawaii 1970).
I 19. See text aComplianying notes 306-11 ,spnra.
150. 397 1'.S. 337 (1970).

(6th Cir. 1970): Leighton v.
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might be justified to prevent his lisruiltion of the trial. Nevertheless,
the Court conceded that such a procedure is itself an affront to the
dignity of the court and inhibits the ability of the defendant to consult
with his counsel. Similar objections may be made to the use of handcuffs and shackles in the courtr oom. W oodards v. Cardwell"- 1 acknowledged the prevailing view that "shackles should never be permitted
except to prevent the escape of the accused, to protect everyone in the
courtroom, and to maintain order during the trial.'' 45 '2 Here the court
found an abuse of discretion by the trial court in compelling the l)etlt
.
- '
tioner to remain shackled during the trial. '
4. Trial by Jury. a. Nature of Right. The right to trial by jury was
made applicable to the states in Duncan v. Louisiana4 54 in 1968.
j 4 - The
Duncan case entailed a potential punishment of two years imprisonment,
and the Court inlicated that the right would probably not apply to
''petty offenses" where the potential punishment did not exceed six
months, although it was unnecessary to determine the cut-off point at
that time. In Baldwin v. New York 4 ; , G the Court explicitly held that
where the potential punishment exceeds six months the accused is constitutionally entitled to a trial by jury.
The )uncan Court reserved judgment as to whether the application
of the sixth amendment right to trial by julry to the states carried with
it all the attributes of a july trial in federal courts. In Williams V.
Florida1 : 7 the Court was called upon to determine whether a six-ilan
jury would satisfy constitutional reCuirements. After an extended historical analysis of the development of the right, 4- S the Court concluded
that "the number should probably be large enough to promote group
deliberation fi-ee from outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide
a fair possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the commtnity,'' 4 9 but that six could adequately accomplish these goals"particularly ifthe requir emen t Of' Unanimity is retained.''4601
451. 430 F.2d 978 (6th Cir. 1970).
452. Id. at 982.
453. See also Righy v. Russell, 287 F. Stipp. 325 (E.D. Tenn. 1968): State ex rel.
Hathaway v. Henderson, 432 S.W.2d 503 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1968): Slate ex rel.
Hall v. Meadows, 215 Tenn. 668. 389 S.W.2d 256 (1965); Poe v. State, 78 Tenn.
673 (1882); Matthews %. State, 77 Tenn. 128 (1882).
454. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
455. See 1968 Survey at 261; 1969 Smu,ey at 495.
456. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
457. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
458. Id. at 86-100.
459. Id. at 100.
46). Id.
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The right to a trial by jury may, of course, be waived.41"; The effec4 2
tiveness of such a waiver arose in a unique fashion in State v. Dunn.
The respondent plead not guilty to a charge of assault and battery,
and the case was set for trial on a Friday, a month and a half hence.
By "custom or unwritten rule of the trial court" Friday was devoted
to non-jury matters. Counsel for the defendant was fully aware of this
rule. Respondent appeared for trial on the designated date, was tried
without a jury and found guilty. Thereafter he filed a motion for a
new trial, for the first time alleging that setting the case for a Friday
placed a burden on his right to trial by jury. The court of criminal
appeals re'ersed the conviction holding that the waiver of a jury trial
must appear affirmatively on the record. The supreme court reversed
the decision of the intermediate appellate court and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. While acknowledging the desirability of a
record showing of waiver, the court was disinclined to hold that such
was essential where an examination of the facts showed a knowing and
intentional waiver.
b. Discrimination in Selection. While it is clear that there must
be no invidious discrimination against races or other classes in the
selection of a trial jury,468 it does not follow that a defendant is entitled
4 4
It is not
to have members of his race actually serving on the jury. "
clear whether an accused will be heard to object to the systematic exclusion of members of a class of which he is not a member. While finding
4 5
it unnecessary to decide the issue, the court in Yonng v. State 6 suggested that in special circumstances such an argument might be well
1

taken.46 6

c. Determiniation of Punishment. In Maxwell v. Bishop4,7 the
United States Supreme Court gave 1lWitherspoon v. Illinois46s retroactive
application and held that the exclusion of three potential jurors for
cause because of their attitude toward capital punishment could con-

461. See TNN. CotE ANN. § 40-2705 (1955).
462. 453 SAV.2d 777 (Tenn. 1970).
463. Strruder v. West Virginia, 100 '.S. 303 (1880); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1881).
464. Bush v. Kentucky. 107 U.S. 110 (1883); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965);
Johnson v. State, 456 S.V.2d 864 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
465. 458 S.W.2d 635 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
466. "A white civil rights worker from another state accused of crime while leading
the black members of a southern rural community in a segregation march might
legitimately complain if all of the Negroes of the county who had reason to
respect and admire his convictions were excluded from the jury to make room
for white citizens who might resent his presence in their midst." Id. at 636.
467. 398 U.S. 262 (1970).
468. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
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ceivably invalidate the conviction. If a prospective juror indicates that
his conscientious scruples would completely preclude his invoking the
4 69
death penalty, Witherspoon will permit his exclusion from the jury.
The excluded jurors in the present case, however, did not express such
an unequivocal attitude. The case was remanded for re-consideration
4 70
in light of Witherspoon.
L. Punishment
An indeterminate sentence provides for imprisonment for a mininuim
and a maximum period of time. It is treated as a sentence for the
maximum period with the individual becoming eligible for parole, subject to administrative discretion, upon completion of the mininum
portion. 4 71 A minimum sentence must be specified by the sentencing
court. 47 2
Where an indeterminate sentence is imposed when a
determinate sentence was proper, the error may be corrected without
voiding the judgment.473
An accused has a constitutional right to a trial by jury in all but petty
offenses T74 and it is improper to penalize him for exercising that right
by imposing a stiffer sentence than would have been meted out had
there been a plea of guilty. It is almost always impossible, however,
for a defendant to prove vindictiveness.4 '
Certainly the imposition
of a lesser penalty on a guilty-pleading defendant does not demonstrate
improper preferential treatment. The principal motivation for entering
a guilty plea is the belief that the probabilities favor the accepted ptmishment being less than that which would result from a trial. Thus in
Harrison v. State47e1 the court held that the fact that the defendant
received a thirty year sentence imposed by a jury for armed robbery
while two co-defendants who )lead guilty each received ten years for
the same offense was not a judicially reviewable discrepancy since "no
one knows what a jury will do and the decision to bargain for and

469. Id. at 516 n.9.
470. And see Woodards v. Cardwell, 430 F.2d 978, 980 (6th Cir. 1970): Ilitherspoon
. . . does not invalidate the guilty verdict. It holds only that the death sentence
imposed by an improperly selected jury cannot )e executed.'
471. The constitutionality of such sentences has been upheld. See Wood v. Stato
130 Tenn. 100, 169 S.W. 558 (1914). Parole is not a matter of right. Hinkle v.
Ohio Parole Authority, 419 F.2d 130 (6th Cir. 1967).
472. Carter v. State, 447 S.W.2d 115 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
473. State ex rel. Irwin v. State, 451 SAV.2d 701 (Tenn. Crin.
App. 1969). See also
1968 Survey at 268-69.
474. See discussion accompanying notes 454-56 snpra.
475. Perhaps the clearest exception is United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Stpp. 679 (N.D.
Ill. 1960).
476. 455 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
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accept a sentence certain in its terms is one that must be made freely
by each person who finds himself in danger of being convicted of
crime."477
The issue could not be so quickly disposed of in United States v.
At the time of sentencing the trial judge
frankly observed,
H/Vallace, 4 78 a non-jury trial.

If Mr. Wallace had come in here and faced up to it and simply
admitted to what in this Court's mind was proven to practically
a mathematical certainty, that might be one thing. That in our
4
judgment certainly would have been a probation situation. ,i
Sentence was thereulpon entered. Ti defendant contended that he had
been penalized for not having admitted his guilt and for standing trial.
The appellate coutt, however, saw a different explanation. The trial
judge had concluded that the guilt of the defendant had been proven
'practically to a mathematical certainty." Nevertheless, the defendant
had taken the stand and lenied every aspect of the charge. Rather
than being put out with the defendant's demand for a trial, the comments of the judge at the time of sentencing manifested the belief that
the defendant had committed perjury since his testimony was inconsistent
with the findings of fact.
M.

)oible Jeopardy

Multiple
l.
jurisdictions. In I/f/al/er v. Fiorida " -' the United States
Supreme Court held that the protection against double jeopardy precludes convictions foi violation of a Inunicipal ordinance and a state
StLatute based on the same acts. The petitioner had been convicted of
the destruction of government property and breach of the peace under
the municipal ordinance, and of grand larceny under the state statute.
Because municipalities derive their governmental authority from their
state governments, and therefore ate not independent sovereignties, the
H:Vollcr decision does not overrule prior decisions of the Court pet -

,177. Id. at (its.

"(Ceitainly, the co-defendants of plaintiff in crior would not have
been in a position to have their sentences modified or set aside if the plaintiff
in crror had been convicted of a lesser offense and sentenced to five years, or
a(quitted altogether. Ilhcy chose to accept certainty rattier than risk the outcoine
of a trial. This course appeals to some: others, apparently as did the appellant
liie, hiad railer gaiilule on the outcome, ignoring Hamlet's observation that
it

is better

io l

ear these ills we have than

Id. at 61l8-19.
478. 418 F.2d 876

(6th Cii . 1969).

479. Id. at 877.
480. "397 tC.S. "387 (1970).

fly

to others that we kiiow

not of."
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for offenses arising

2. Multiple Offenses. A single act may result in the commission
of two or more offenses, and there is no constitutional impediment to
multiple convictions with consecutive sentences, absent a resulting
punishment which is shockingly disproportionate to the conduct of the
defendant. A question of double jeopardy only arises where one charge
is a lesser included offense of another-all of its elements are included
in the more serious charge. 4 2 This cumulative result was graphically
illustrated in the 1958 decision, Gore v. United States,4 S 3 where the
defendant, as a result of a single narcotics transaction, was convicted of
(I) the sale of drugs not in pursuance of a written order, (2) the sale
of drugs not in the original stamped package, and (3) facilitating concealinen t and sale of drugs known to be illegally imported. The Court
484
affirmed conviction on all counts.
A frequently arising fact situation concerns the charging of a defendant with burglary and with the offense committed or attempted once
the premises was entered. Clearly the subsequent felony is not subsumed
in the burglary charge as the latter only requires an intent to commit
48 the felony at the time of the entering, and most courts have so held. ;
Tennessee courts have consistently held, however, that a conviction for
46
burglary and larceny arising out of the same event cannot be sustained. 8
This rule was followed in two recent decisions. 48 '
A broader limitation on multiple prosectltions was enunciated in
White v. State 4s8 where the court held that a defendant could not be
convicted of both second degree murder and armed robbery arising out
481. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922): Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S.
187 (1959).
More vulnerable to constitutional attack is Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121 (1959), where a federal conviction was obtained after a state acquittal.
Such a prosecution may be effected now by the collateral estoppel standard of
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (See discussion accompanying notes 491-95
infra). Bartkus was not discussed by the majority in that case.
482. Yearwood %. State, 455 S.W.2d 612 (Tenn. Crim. App., 1970); Carr v. State, 455
S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
483. 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
484. See also United States v. Barnett, 418 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1969).
And see State v. Shaw, 219 So. 2d 49 (Fla. App. 1969), where the defendant
shot a pregnant woman and was convicted of both manslaughter of the unborn
child (a statutory offense) and assault with intent to murder the woman. The
court held both convictions permissible.
485. See 2 WHARTON § 443.
486. State v. DeGraffenreid, 68 Tenn. 287 (1878); Cronin %. State, 113 Tenn. 539,
82 S.W. 477 (1904).
487. Mitchell v. State, 458 S.W.2d 630 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970); Carter v. State,

447 S.W.2d 115 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
488. 454 S.W.2d 159 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969).
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of a single transaction, because the two offenses were "inspired by the
same criminal intent." 4s1" Obviously, this is not literally correct. The
homicide charge requires proof of an intent to kill; the robbery charge
requires proof of an intent to steal. The court would appear to be
talking about motivation rather than intent as used as a term of art. As
such it creates an olportunity for a defendant to have a substantial
4
number of offenses render him susceptible to but a single conviction. 90
3. Multiple Victims. In Ashe v. Swenson 4 .19 the defendant and three
others were charged with seven separate offenses-the arned robbery of
each of six poker players and the theft of an automobile. The defendant
was first tried for robbing one of the poker players. The jury was
instructed that if they found that the defendant was one of the participants in the armed robbery, if any money was taken from this particular
victim he was guilty, even though he might not have personally robbed
this victim. The jury found the petitioner "not guilty clue to nonsufficient evidence." Six weeks later the defendant was again brought
to trial, this time for the robbery of a second participant in the poker
game. Virtually identical instructions were given to the jury, and he
was found guilty.
In reversing and renanding the case, the U nited States Suprene
Court overruled Hoag v. New .ersey 4 - in light of the subsequent application of the protection against double jeopardy to the states 49 a and the
recognition, in the present case, that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
as a part of the portection against double jeopardy. Here "[t]he single
rationally conceivable issue in dispute before the jury was whether tie
petitioner had been one of the robbers.'' 41"4 Once that question was
answered negatively in the first trial, it was constitutionally impermissible
to relitigate it in this nianner. The Court expressly noted that it was
not suggesting that the petitioner could not have been found guilty of
six robberies and punished separately for each had he been convicted
in a single trial. 4"9 Presumably he could also be found guilty in six
successive trials with no constitutional impediment. The answer is not
clear, however, should he be found guilty in the first trial and not
489. Id. at 162.

'190. See also Valton v. State, 448 S.\V.2d 690 (Tenn. 1969): Wilcox v. State, 74

571 (1880).
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.

Tenn.

This result i1lav also be accomplished by statute. See Neal v. People, 55 Cal.
2d I1, 357 P.2d 839, 9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (IM90).
397 U.S. 436 (1970).
356 U.S. 464 (1958).
Renton v. Maryland, 395 t,S. 784 (1969).
397 I.S. at 445.
See Ciucci v. Illinois. 356 IS. 571 (1958): Pulley %v.Norwell. 431 F.2d 258 (6th
Cir. 1970).
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gui Ilty in the second. Certainly Ase precludes prosecutions For the
remain ing four 'Victims,but can it be used to collaterally attack the
first conviction?
A. Retrials. a. Grcacr Offense. It is nornially the prerogative of the
jury to bring in a verdict of' guilt of any lesser included offense to the
crime charged in the indictment. \,Vhen the jury exercises this option,
it is viewed as an i plicit finding of not gulilty as to all more seriotis
offenses charged.
In Price v. Georgia4 9 ; the United States Supreme
Cout~rt held that a defendant charged with MUrder but found guilty of
vo<luntaiy manslaughter could be charged with nothing greater than
7
the latter on Ietrial.4
A variation of this problem was presented in Mulirced v. Kropp.4 1s
The defendant was charged in a two count infoirination with armed robbery and unarmed robbery. He plead guilty to the lesser offense, unarmed robbery, and the other count was dropped.
Subsequently he
obtained a reversal of the conviction because he had been (leni ed the
assistance of' counsel.:'"
He was thereafter retried and convicted of
armed robbery. The prosectution conceded, and the court agreed, that
had the defendant been convicted by a jury in the first instance, he
could not have been charged with armed robbery at the second adjudication. But the prosecution contended there had been no factual deterriination other than the assertion of guUilt by the defendant. The court
found, however, that there was no viable distinction between a prioi
judgiment based on a plea of guilt and a jury determination of guilt, and
the rationale of Grceo v. United Sates,''"1 now applicable in state decisioiis, was equally ontrolling where the first convi(tion resu lted from
a plea of guilty.
b. Differcnt Off('nsc. \ defendant may, of course, be convicted of
entirely distinct offense whether he is convicted or exonerated at a
prior trial. In Joh
f
son v. RsslP-1 an acquittal of larceny was held
not to preclide a conviction of receiving and concealing stolen property
at a subsequen t tial.-'1 And in Morclot k a. S/toC5'0; the court held that
ai

,1) . 398 1 .. 323 (1970).
497. Piior to BenIon \. Mairland, 395
.5;.
784 (1969), ilc (oui
had held ihis to
Ib the rule ill federal courts ill Gieen \. t'tited States, 355 1'.S.184 (1957).
498. -125 F.2d 1095 (ith (ii-. 1970).
,499.Nlullreed v. Balnan, 137 F. Supp. 533 (E.). Nfich. 1956).
500. 355 1.S. 181 (1957).
501. 120 F.2d 697 (61 Cir. 1970).
5-02. Cf. United St:tes . Prince, 7 C IM. .. Rii. 2400 (U .S.I)isirit Court, M. Tenn.,
Iily 10. 1970), whcre the court held lhatan acquittal on a charge for possessing
it giln U11(Cl"
OilC portioii of a fedeial fir'eairms
Statite was a ham to i pioseclitiOn
Iol possession under tdifferetiportion of the sale act.
503 .- 51 S.\.2d 189 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970).
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a conviction of burglary was no bar to a further conviction under the
habitual criminal statute by the same jury, since this determination
5 4
only affected the amount of punishment to be administered. 0
c. Greater Punishment. North Carolinav. Pearce511 held that giving
an accused a greater sentence on retrial than he received in his prior
trial did not violate the protection against double jeopardy but that
it could amount to a denial of lue process where the sentencing judge
had penalized the defendant for exercising his right to appeal.5 '" ; Thus,
where greater punishment is imposed, "the factual data upon which
the increased sentence is based inust be made part of the record, so that
the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully
'"
reviewed on a ppeal.''"; In Moon v. Maryland--,
' the imnposition of a
twenty year sentence although the petitioner had received twelve years
originally was upheld where counsel for the petitioner conceded there
had been no vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing judge.
Two recent Tennessee decisions-State ex rel. Pinkard v. Hendersonl)D'
and Britt v. Statc-sl
have held that the Pearce holding is inapplicable
where the determination of sentence at the subsequent trial is made
by a jury. Both decisions assumed that the jury had no knowledge of
the prior conviction oi sentence and thus the judgment was -unpolluted
by vindictiveness.'' - t 1 In the Pinkard case, Galbreath, J., dissenting,
contended it wts inconceivable that the jtiry was iot aware of' the prior
conviction, only two weeks previous, where the defendant was charged
with the rape of a child in a rural county.5' - Interestingly, the defendants in both cases collaterally attacked the judgments in federal courts.
Petitioner Britt was denied relief in Britt v. Toilett, -' a the eastern
district court apparently accepting the rationale of the court of criminal
appeals, absent special circumstances showing vindictiveness. Pinkard,

504. See also Brooks v. State. 7 CRiM. 1L.REP. 2037 (Tenn. Crim. App., March 4, 1970),
wieretlhe defendants were indicted for arnied rollrcy with a rifleand received
a directed erdic(t
of acquittal because the proof showed the rolbbery had been
accomplished with a pistol.
hlie court flnd that the protectioni against double
jeopardy prevtecl a retrial under an amended indictment.
:10-). 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
1)6. See 1969 S ve'Y' at 499. And sce Mrill %. Tollel., 315 F. Supp. 101
(ED.Tenti.

1970).
507. 395 t.S. at 726.

508. 398 t.S. 319 (1970).
509!.-152 S,\V.2d

WtR8(-l'in. Crim. App. 1969).

510. 455 S.\.2d 625 (Temil. Crim. App. 1,f9).
511. Id. at 627.
512. A ninetv-nine yeat seltence was imiposed, as opposedI

to twenty years after the

original conviction. Itt litt the punishment was raised from fifteeti sears to

fifteen-to-thirty Nears.
513. 315 F. Supp. -101 (E.D. Tlem. 1970).
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however, was granted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Pinkard
v. Neil, 5 14 the middle district court finding no viable distinction
between judge and jury determined sentences. It was suggested that
the trial judge could instruct the jury as a matter of law that the
sentence imposed could not exceed that imposed at his previous trial,
absent special justification for increased lunishment. 15 While this
procedure would appear to solve the immediate problem facing the
court, it gives rise to another: By so instructing the jury the court has
emphasized that the defendant has previously been convicted of the
crine of which he is presently charged. Thus the price of preventing
aggravated pnishinent is a significant prejudicing of the defendant as
to the more fundamental question of guilt. Apparently, both goals can
only be accomplished by separating the built-determining function from
the punishment-determining function. The jury would not be instructed
regarding punishment until after they had returned a verdict of guilty. 51 6

514. 311 F. Supp. 711 (M.D.Tenn. 1970).
515. "If such evidence were offered, the judge coul
charge the jury that it must be
sufficient to justify any greater sentence and that the jury must so state in
returning its verdict. Such procedure would not invade the province of the
jury. Once the Supreme Court has stated that, as a matter of law, a defendant
cannot be given an increased sentence upon retrial unless there is affirmative
evidence of conduct subsequent to the first trial, then it becomes the duty of
the judge to follow that decision either in imposing sentence himself in states
following the federal practice which charges the judge with this responsibility,
or in properly charging the jury in states following the Tennessee practice."
Id. at 714.
516. Cf. the comparable procedure employed in the determination of habitual
criminal status. Harrison v. State, 217 Tenn. 31, 394 S.V.2d 713 (1965).
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